| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| SiYuan before v3.7.4 contains an access control bypass vulnerability where static-file routes in the server mux bypass publish-access controls enforced on the REST API. Attackers with publish reader tokens or anonymous access in disabled-auth mode can read templates, snippets, and export artifacts by directly accessing static routes that lack the same restrictions as their REST API counterparts. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the getEncryptedNotebookStatus endpoint that returns encrypted notebook identifiers, names, and lock states without publish-access filtering. Anonymous readers and publish-mode accounts can enumerate all encrypted notebooks and their current unlock status, revealing sensitive notebook names and decryption state in memory. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 fail to properly filter related-database content in renderAttributeView, allowing anonymous readers to access Relation and Rollup cell contents from hidden or password-protected databases. Attackers can request published databases that relate to restricted databases to retrieve sensitive content, or bypass row filtering entirely when the first column is a non-block type. |
| SiYuan before v3.7.4 (affected <=v3.7.2) fails to enforce publish-access filters on five filetree path-resolution endpoints (getFullHPathByID, getHPathByID, getPathByID, getIDsByHPath, and getHPathByPath). In publish mode, when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, an unauthenticated (anonymous) reader — or any publish reader token — can call these endpoints to enumerate the complete private document tree, mapping notebook names, folder hierarchies, and document titles, and resolving title paths to document IDs, including for documents marked hidden, password-protected, or publish-forbidden. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 fail to apply publish-access filtering to the getAttributeViewKeysByID endpoint, allowing authenticated readers to retrieve complete database column schemas including descriptions, select vocabularies, and template expressions. Additionally, getBlockDefIDsByRefText and getBlockRelevantIDs endpoints enumerate workspace-wide block IDs without publish scoping, enabling attackers to discover valid block identifiers across publish boundaries and access content from hidden or password-protected documents. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 disclose encrypted-notebook key-derivation material and wrapped data keys through unauthenticated endpoints in publish mode. Attackers can retrieve Argon2id salt, cost parameters, password verifiers, and wrapped notebook keys to perform unlimited offline master-password cracking without rate limiting. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the resolveAssetPath endpoint that returns absolute filesystem paths unmodified to CheckAuth-only requests. Attackers can harvest relative asset paths from published documents and submit them to resolveAssetPath to obtain the server's absolute workspace path, disclosing the operating-system username and installation layout. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 fail to enforce publish-access checks in the getBlockAttrs and batchGetBlockAttrs endpoints. Attackers can retrieve block attributes including names, aliases, memos, and custom fields from protected documents by sending POST requests with block IDs. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 fail to validate publish-password tier in getGraph and getLocalGraph endpoints, allowing anonymous readers to retrieve block-level content of password-protected documents. Attackers can call these endpoints without supplying a password to read protected document content and the complete reference topology. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 fail to enforce publish-access checks on getBlockBreadcrumb, getRefText, and getBlockTreeInfos endpoints, allowing disclosure of protected document content and metadata. Anonymous readers or publish RoleReader accounts can retrieve document titles, ancestor block content snippets, reference text, and path metadata for publish-forbidden or password-protected documents by supplying block IDs. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in the FilterViewByPublishAccess filter that fails to check publish password protection when rendering attribute views and database rows. Unauthenticated readers can access password-protected document rows including titles, block IDs, and column values by calling renderAttributeView without supplying the required password. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain a second-order SQL injection vulnerability in attribute-view template columns that expose the queryBlocks function, which executes raw SQL using string substitution instead of parameterized queries. Attackers can distribute malicious SiYuan documents or packages with crafted template columns that execute arbitrary SQL on a victim's kernel when the package is imported and rendered, enabling read and write access across notebooks. |
| SiYuan versions up to and including v3.7.2 (fixed in v3.7.4) contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the /api/asset/getFileAnnotation endpoint, which returns .sya PDF-annotation file content without a publish-access check. Because the endpoint is gated only by CheckAuth (unlike the /assets/* route, which enforces publish access and password), an anonymous reader (when publish authentication is disabled) or any publish RoleReader who knows an asset path can read the private PDF annotations (highlights and notes) of publish-forbidden, password-protected, or unpublished documents. The issue is limited to non-encrypted notebooks; encrypted-box annotations are not exposed. |
| SiYuan versions <= v3.7.2 (patched in v3.7.4) contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in the kernel's CheckAuth function, which grants the administrator role (RoleAdministrator) to any request whose RemoteAddr is loopback (127.0.0.1) for a specific set of endpoints (including /api/system/exit, getNetwork, getWorkspaceInfo, /assets/*, and /export/*). These localhost bypasses sit outside the access auth code gate, so they apply even when an access auth code is configured. Because the fixed-port reverse proxy forwards requests to the kernel over loopback without injecting an authentication token and does not configure trusted proxies, a request forwarded through this proxy reaches the kernel with RemoteAddr = 127.0.0.1. If the fixed-port proxy is bound to a network interface, this could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to obtain admin access on the affected endpoints; however, per the advisory this remote forwarding behavior was established only by code inspection and was not reproduced end-to-end. |
| SiYuan versions <= v3.7.2 expose the /api/search/searchEmbedBlock endpoint, which passes a client-supplied SQL statement verbatim to the main read-write siyuan.db handle with no single-statement, read-only, or admin restrictions. The endpoint is gated only by CheckAuth, making it reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by anonymous users when publish authentication is disabled. Because the underlying driver executes stacked statements, an attacker can read and modify content across all opened cleartext notebooks (encrypted per-box notebooks are excluded). Fixed in v3.7.3. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.3 contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in publish mode where content-returning endpoints getHeadingChildrenDOM, getHeading*Transaction, and getBacklinkDoc perform no password check despite protecting the primary getDoc endpoint. Anonymous attackers can retrieve full content of password-protected documents by obtaining internal block IDs from reader-accessible endpoints and calling unprotected content endpoints to bypass the password gate. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.3 contain SQL injection vulnerabilities in the fullTextSearchAssetContent endpoint reachable by unauthenticated users and publish RoleReader tokens. Attackers can execute arbitrary SQL on the read-write asset-content database via unescaped method parameters and REGEXP clauses to read, modify, or delete cross-notebook data. |
| SiYuan before v3.7.3 fails to apply publish-access filters to the getBacklinkDoc and getBackmentionDoc content endpoints (/api/ref/getBacklinkDoc and /api/ref/getBackmentionDoc). While the corresponding backlink list endpoints filter publish-forbidden documents, the content endpoints (gated only by CheckAuth) do not. A publish-mode reader — including an anonymous reader when publish Basic Auth is disabled — can call these endpoints directly with a publish-forbidden document's ID to retrieve its rendered DOM content and to determine whether the document references a given block (a reference-existence oracle). |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.3 fail to validate the avID parameter on all code branches in attribute-view read endpoints, allowing attackers to construct traversal paths that escape the storage directory. Authenticated users with RoleReader permissions or anonymous clients when publish authentication is disabled can read JSON files outside the attribute-view directory to disclose cross-scope database content. |
| SiYuan versions before v3.7.3 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the getHeadingDeleteTransaction, getHeadingLevelTransaction, and getHeadingInsertTransaction endpoints that return rendered block DOM without publish-access checks. Anonymous readers or publish RoleReader tokens can supply a heading block ID to read full rendered content of publish-disabled documents that should be restricted. |
