| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/pNFS: Fix a race to wake on NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN
We found a few different systems hung up in writeback waiting on the same
page lock, and one task waiting on the NFS_LAYOUT_DRAIN bit in
pnfs_update_layout(), however the pnfs_layout_hdr's plh_outstanding count
was zero.
It seems most likely that this is another race between the waiter and waker
similar to commit ed0172af5d6f ("SUNRPC: Fix a race to wake a sync task").
Fix it up by applying the advised barrier. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Refuse to evaluate a method if arguments are missing
As reported in [1], a platform firmware update that increased the number
of method parameters and forgot to update a least one of its callers,
caused ACPICA to crash due to use-after-free.
Since this a result of a clear AML issue that arguably cannot be fixed
up by the interpreter (it cannot produce missing data out of thin air),
address it by making ACPICA refuse to evaluate a method if the caller
attempts to pass fewer arguments than expected to it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix iteration of extrefs during log replay
At __inode_add_ref() when processing extrefs, if we jump into the next
label we have an undefined value of victim_name.len, since we haven't
initialized it before we did the goto. This results in an invalid memory
access in the next iteration of the loop since victim_name.len was not
initialized to the length of the name of the current extref.
Fix this by initializing victim_name.len with the current extref's name
length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rose: fix dangling neighbour pointers in rose_rt_device_down()
There are two bugs in rose_rt_device_down() that can cause
use-after-free:
1. The loop bound `t->count` is modified within the loop, which can
cause the loop to terminate early and miss some entries.
2. When removing an entry from the neighbour array, the subsequent entries
are moved up to fill the gap, but the loop index `i` is still
incremented, causing the next entry to be skipped.
For example, if a node has three neighbours (A, A, B) with count=3 and A
is being removed, the second A is not checked.
i=0: (A, A, B) -> (A, B) with count=2
^ checked
i=1: (A, B) -> (A, B) with count=2
^ checked (B, not A!)
i=2: (doesn't occur because i < count is false)
This leaves the second A in the array with count=2, but the rose_neigh
structure has been freed. Code that accesses these entries assumes that
the first `count` entries are valid pointers, causing a use-after-free
when it accesses the dangling pointer.
Fix both issues by iterating over the array in reverse order with a fixed
loop bound. This ensures that all entries are examined and that the removal
of an entry doesn't affect subsequent iterations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio-net: ensure the received length does not exceed allocated size
In xdp_linearize_page, when reading the following buffers from the ring,
we forget to check the received length with the true allocate size. This
can lead to an out-of-bound read. This commit adds that missing check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix a race between renames and directory logging
We have a race between a rename and directory inode logging that if it
happens and we crash/power fail before the rename completes, the next time
the filesystem is mounted, the log replay code will end up deleting the
file that was being renamed.
This is best explained following a step by step analysis of an interleaving
of steps that lead into this situation.
Consider the initial conditions:
1) We are at transaction N;
2) We have directories A and B created in a past transaction (< N);
3) We have inode X corresponding to a file that has 2 hardlinks, one in
directory A and the other in directory B, so we'll name them as
"A/foo_link1" and "B/foo_link2". Both hard links were persisted in a
past transaction (< N);
4) We have inode Y corresponding to a file that as a single hard link and
is located in directory A, we'll name it as "A/bar". This file was also
persisted in a past transaction (< N).
The steps leading to a file loss are the following and for all of them we
are under transaction N:
1) Link "A/foo_link1" is removed, so inode's X last_unlink_trans field
is updated to N, through btrfs_unlink() -> btrfs_record_unlink_dir();
2) Task A starts a rename for inode Y, with the goal of renaming from
"A/bar" to "A/baz", so we enter btrfs_rename();
3) Task A inserts the new BTRFS_INODE_REF_KEY for inode Y by calling
btrfs_insert_inode_ref();
4) Because the rename happens in the same directory, we don't set the
last_unlink_trans field of directoty A's inode to the current
transaction id, that is, we don't cal btrfs_record_unlink_dir();
5) Task A then removes the entries from directory A (BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY
and BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY items) when calling __btrfs_unlink_inode()
(actually the dir index item is added as a delayed item, but the
effect is the same);
6) Now before task A adds the new entry "A/baz" to directory A by
calling btrfs_add_link(), another task, task B is logging inode X;
7) Task B starts a fsync of inode X and after logging inode X, at
btrfs_log_inode_parent() it calls btrfs_log_all_parents(), since
inode X has a last_unlink_trans value of N, set at in step 1;
8) At btrfs_log_all_parents() we search for all parent directories of
inode X using the commit root, so we find directories A and B and log
them. Bu when logging direct A, we don't have a dir index item for
inode Y anymore, neither the old name "A/bar" nor for the new name
"A/baz" since the rename has deleted the old name but has not yet
inserted the new name - task A hasn't called yet btrfs_add_link() to
do that.
Note that logging directory A doesn't fallback to a transaction
commit because its last_unlink_trans has a lower value than the
current transaction's id (see step 4);
9) Task B finishes logging directories A and B and gets back to
btrfs_sync_file() where it calls btrfs_sync_log() to persist the log
tree;
10) Task B successfully persisted the log tree, btrfs_sync_log() completed
with success, and a power failure happened.
We have a log tree without any directory entry for inode Y, so the
log replay code deletes the entry for inode Y, name "A/bar", from the
subvolume tree since it doesn't exist in the log tree and the log
tree is authorative for its index (we logged a BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY
item that covers the index range for the dentry that corresponds to
"A/bar").
Since there's no other hard link for inode Y and the log replay code
deletes the name "A/bar", the file is lost.
The issue wouldn't happen if task B synced the log only after task A
called btrfs_log_new_name(), which would update the log with the new name
for inode Y ("A/bar").
Fix this by pinning the log root during renames before removing the old
directory entry, and unpinning af
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
posix-cpu-timers: fix race between handle_posix_cpu_timers() and posix_cpu_timer_del()
If an exiting non-autoreaping task has already passed exit_notify() and
calls handle_posix_cpu_timers() from IRQ, it can be reaped by its parent
or debugger right after unlock_task_sighand().
If a concurrent posix_cpu_timer_del() runs at that moment, it won't be
able to detect timer->it.cpu.firing != 0: cpu_timer_task_rcu() and/or
lock_task_sighand() will fail.
Add the tsk->exit_state check into run_posix_cpu_timers() to fix this.
This fix is not needed if CONFIG_POSIX_CPU_TIMERS_TASK_WORK=y, because
exit_task_work() is called before exit_notify(). But the check still
makes sense, task_work_add(&tsk->posix_cputimers_work.work) will fail
anyway in this case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
software node: Correct a OOB check in software_node_get_reference_args()
software_node_get_reference_args() wants to get @index-th element, so
the property value requires at least '(index + 1) * sizeof(*ref)' bytes
but that can not be guaranteed by current OOB check, and may cause OOB
for malformed property.
Fix by using as OOB check '((index + 1) * sizeof(*ref) > prop->length)'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: cortina: Use TOE/TSO on all TCP
It is desireable to push the hardware accelerator to also
process non-segmented TCP frames: we pass the skb->len
to the "TOE/TSO" offloader and it will handle them.
Without this quirk the driver becomes unstable and lock
up and and crash.
I do not know exactly why, but it is probably due to the
TOE (TCP offload engine) feature that is coupled with the
segmentation feature - it is not possible to turn one
part off and not the other, either both TOE and TSO are
active, or neither of them.
Not having the TOE part active seems detrimental, as if
that hardware feature is not really supposed to be turned
off.
The datasheet says:
"Based on packet parsing and TCP connection/NAT table
lookup results, the NetEngine puts the packets
belonging to the same TCP connection to the same queue
for the software to process. The NetEngine puts
incoming packets to the buffer or series of buffers
for a jumbo packet. With this hardware acceleration,
IP/TCP header parsing, checksum validation and
connection lookup are offloaded from the software
processing."
After numerous tests with the hardware locking up after
something between minutes and hours depending on load
using iperf3 I have concluded this is necessary to stabilize
the hardware. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix node corruption in ar->arvifs list
In current WLAN recovery code flow, ath11k_core_halt() only
reinitializes the "arvifs" list head. This will cause the
list node immediately following the list head to become an
invalid list node. Because the prev of that node still points
to the list head "arvifs", but the next of the list head "arvifs"
no longer points to that list node.
When a WLAN recovery occurs during the execution of a vif
removal, and it happens before the spin_lock_bh(&ar->data_lock)
in ath11k_mac_op_remove_interface(), list_del() will detect the
previously mentioned situation, thereby triggering a kernel panic.
The fix is to remove and reinitialize all vif list nodes from the
list head "arvifs" during WLAN halt. The reinitialization is to make
the list nodes valid, ensuring that the list_del() in
ath11k_mac_op_remove_interface() can execute normally.
Call trace:
__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xb8/0xd0
ath11k_mac_op_remove_interface+0xb0/0x27c [ath11k]
drv_remove_interface+0x48/0x194 [mac80211]
ieee80211_do_stop+0x6e0/0x844 [mac80211]
ieee80211_stop+0x44/0x17c [mac80211]
__dev_close_many+0xac/0x150
__dev_change_flags+0x194/0x234
dev_change_flags+0x24/0x6c
devinet_ioctl+0x3a0/0x670
inet_ioctl+0x200/0x248
sock_do_ioctl+0x60/0x118
sock_ioctl+0x274/0x35c
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0xf0
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
...
Tested-on: QCA6698AQ hw2.1 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-04591-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_IOE-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: tipc: fix refcount warning in tipc_aead_encrypt
syzbot reported a refcount warning [1] caused by calling get_net() on
a network namespace that is being destroyed (refcount=0). This happens
when a TIPC discovery timer fires during network namespace cleanup.
The recently added get_net() call in commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc:
fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") attempts to
hold a reference to the network namespace. However, if the namespace
is already being destroyed, its refcount might be zero, leading to the
use-after-free warning.
Replace get_net() with maybe_get_net(), which safely checks if the
refcount is non-zero before incrementing it. If the namespace is being
destroyed, return -ENODEV early, after releasing the bearer reference.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/#m12019cf9ae77e1954f666914640efa36d52704a2 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: serial: uartlite: register uart driver in init
When two instances of uart devices are probing, a concurrency race can
occur. If one thread calls uart_register_driver function, which first
allocates and assigns memory to 'uart_state' member of uart_driver
structure, the other instance can bypass uart driver registration and
call ulite_assign. This calls uart_add_one_port, which expects the uart
driver to be fully initialized. This leads to a kernel panic due to a
null pointer dereference:
[ 8.143581] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002b8
[ 8.156982] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 8.156984] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 8.156986] PGD 0 P4D 0
...
[ 8.180668] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x19/0x30
[ 8.188624] Call Trace:
[ 8.188629] ? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f
[ 8.195260] ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x290
[ 8.209183] ? __irq_resolve_mapping+0x47/0x80
[ 8.209187] ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140
[ 8.209190] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 8.209196] ? mutex_lock+0x19/0x30
[ 8.223116] uart_add_one_port+0x60/0x440
[ 8.223122] ? proc_tty_register_driver+0x43/0x50
[ 8.223126] ? tty_register_driver+0x1ca/0x1e0
[ 8.246250] ulite_probe+0x357/0x4b0 [uartlite]
To prevent it, move uart driver registration in to init function. This
will ensure that uart_driver is always registered when probe function
is called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/pkey: Prevent overflow in size calculation for memdup_user()
Number of apqn target list entries contained in 'nr_apqns' variable is
determined by userspace via an ioctl call so the result of the product in
calculation of size passed to memdup_user() may overflow.
In this case the actual size of the allocated area and the value
describing it won't be in sync leading to various types of unpredictable
behaviour later.
Use a proper memdup_array_user() helper which returns an error if an
overflow is detected. Note that it is different from when nr_apqns is
initially zero - that case is considered valid and should be handled in
subsequent pkey_handler implementations.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: megaraid_sas: Fix invalid node index
On a system with DRAM interleave enabled, out-of-bound access is
detected:
megaraid_sas 0000:3f:00.0: requested/available msix 128/128 poll_queue 0
------------[ cut here ]------------
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in ./arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h:72:28
index -1 is out of range for type 'cpumask *[1024]'
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x2b
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x46/0x4b
megasas_alloc_irq_vectors+0x149/0x190 [megaraid_sas]
megasas_probe_one.cold+0xa4d/0x189c [megaraid_sas]
local_pci_probe+0x42/0x90
pci_device_probe+0xdc/0x290
really_probe+0xdb/0x340
__driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
__driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
bus_for_each_dev+0x8b/0xe0
bus_add_driver+0x142/0x220
driver_register+0x72/0xd0
megasas_init+0xdf/0xff0 [megaraid_sas]
do_one_initcall+0x57/0x310
do_init_module+0x90/0x250
init_module_from_file+0x85/0xc0
idempotent_init_module+0x114/0x310
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x65/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x82/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Fix it accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: validate AG parameters in dbMount() to prevent crashes
Validate db_agheight, db_agwidth, and db_agstart in dbMount to catch
corrupted metadata early and avoid undefined behavior in dbAllocAG.
Limits are derived from L2LPERCTL, LPERCTL/MAXAG, and CTLTREESIZE:
- agheight: 0 to L2LPERCTL/2 (0 to 5) ensures shift
(L2LPERCTL - 2*agheight) >= 0.
- agwidth: 1 to min(LPERCTL/MAXAG, 2^(L2LPERCTL - 2*agheight))
ensures agperlev >= 1.
- Ranges: 1-8 (agheight 0-3), 1-4 (agheight 4), 1 (agheight 5).
- LPERCTL/MAXAG = 1024/128 = 8 limits leaves per AG;
2^(10 - 2*agheight) prevents division to 0.
- agstart: 0 to CTLTREESIZE-1 - agwidth*(MAXAG-1) keeps ti within
stree (size 1365).
- Ranges: 0-1237 (agwidth 1), 0-348 (agwidth 8).
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1400:9
shift exponent -335544310 is negative
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5822 Comm: syz-executor130 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x3c8/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:468
dbAllocAG+0x1087/0x10b0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1400
dbDiscardAG+0x352/0xa20 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1613
jfs_ioc_trim+0x45a/0x6b0 fs/jfs/jfs_discard.c:105
jfs_ioctl+0x2cd/0x3e0 fs/jfs/ioctl.c:131
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on sit_bitmap_size
w/ below testcase, resize will generate a corrupted image which
contains inconsistent metadata, so when mounting such image, it
will trigger kernel panic:
touch img
truncate -s $((512*1024*1024*1024)) img
mkfs.f2fs -f img $((256*1024*1024))
resize.f2fs -s -i img -t $((1024*1024*1024))
mount img /mnt/f2fs
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.h:863!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 3922 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1+ #191 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x47c/0x490
Call Trace:
f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x11c3/0x2600
f2fs_fill_super+0xe97/0x2840
mount_bdev+0xf4/0x140
legacy_get_tree+0x2b/0x50
vfs_get_tree+0x29/0xd0
path_mount+0x487/0xaf0
__x64_sys_mount+0x116/0x150
do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fdbfde1bcfe
The reaseon is:
sit_i->bitmap_size is 192, so size of sit bitmap is 192*8=1536, at maximum
there are 1536 sit blocks, however MAIN_SEGS is 261893, so that sit_blk_cnt
is 4762, build_sit_entries() -> current_sit_addr() tries to access
out-of-boundary in sit_bitmap at offset from [1536, 4762), once sit_bitmap
and sit_bitmap_mirror is not the same, it will trigger f2fs_bug_on().
Let's add sanity check in f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt() to avoid panic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/iwcm: Fix use-after-free of work objects after cm_id destruction
The commit 59c68ac31e15 ("iw_cm: free cm_id resources on the last
deref") simplified cm_id resource management by freeing cm_id once all
references to the cm_id were removed. The references are removed either
upon completion of iw_cm event handlers or when the application destroys
the cm_id. This commit introduced the use-after-free condition where
cm_id_private object could still be in use by event handler works during
the destruction of cm_id. The commit aee2424246f9 ("RDMA/iwcm: Fix a
use-after-free related to destroying CM IDs") addressed this use-after-
free by flushing all pending works at the cm_id destruction.
However, still another use-after-free possibility remained. It happens
with the work objects allocated for each cm_id_priv within
alloc_work_entries() during cm_id creation, and subsequently freed in
dealloc_work_entries() once all references to the cm_id are removed.
If the cm_id's last reference is decremented in the event handler work,
the work object for the work itself gets removed, and causes the use-
after-free BUG below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __pwq_activate_work+0x1ff/0x250
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811f9cf800 by task kworker/u16:1/147091
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 147091 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2+ #27 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
Workqueue: 0x0 (iw_cm_wq)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90
print_report+0x174/0x554
? __virt_addr_valid+0x208/0x430
? __pwq_activate_work+0x1ff/0x250
kasan_report+0xae/0x170
? __pwq_activate_work+0x1ff/0x250
__pwq_activate_work+0x1ff/0x250
pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x8c5/0xfb0
process_one_work+0xc11/0x1460
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? assign_work+0x16c/0x240
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xfd0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x3b0/0x770
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 147416:
kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xb0
alloc_work_entries+0xa9/0x260 [iw_cm]
iw_cm_connect+0x23/0x4a0 [iw_cm]
rdma_connect_locked+0xbfd/0x1920 [rdma_cm]
nvme_rdma_cm_handler+0x8e5/0x1b60 [nvme_rdma]
cma_cm_event_handler+0xae/0x320 [rdma_cm]
cma_work_handler+0x106/0x1b0 [rdma_cm]
process_one_work+0x84f/0x1460
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xfd0
kthread+0x3b0/0x770
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 147091:
kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70
kfree+0x13a/0x4b0
dealloc_work_entries+0x125/0x1f0 [iw_cm]
iwcm_deref_id+0x6f/0xa0 [iw_cm]
cm_work_handler+0x136/0x1ba0 [iw_cm]
process_one_work+0x84f/0x1460
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xfd0
kthread+0x3b0/0x770
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50
kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0
__queue_work+0x2ff/0x1390
queue_work_on+0x67/0xc0
cm_event_handler+0x46a/0x820 [iw_cm]
siw_cm_upcall+0x330/0x650 [siw]
siw_cm_work_handler+0x6b9/0x2b20 [siw]
process_one_work+0x84f/0x1460
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xfd0
kthread+0x3b0/0x770
ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
This BUG is reproducible by repeating the blktests test case nvme/061
for the rdma transport and the siw driver.
To avoid the use-after-free of cm_id_private work objects, ensure that
the last reference to the cm_id is decremented not in the event handler
works, but in the cm_id destruction context. For that purpose, mo
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: fix array-index-out-of-bounds read in add_missing_indices
stbl is s8 but it must contain offsets into slot which can go from 0 to
127.
Added a bound check for that error and return -EIO if the check fails.
Also make jfs_readdir return with error if add_missing_indices returns
with an error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: dell_rbu: Fix list usage
Pass the correct list head to list_for_each_entry*() when looping through
the packet list.
Without this patch, reading the packet data via sysfs will show the data
incorrectly (because it starts at the wrong packet), and clearing the
packet list will result in a NULL pointer dereference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: sch_sfq: reject invalid perturb period
Gerrard Tai reported that SFQ perturb_period has no range check yet,
and this can be used to trigger a race condition fixed in a separate patch.
We want to make sure ctl->perturb_period * HZ will not overflow
and is positive.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb -10 # negative value : error
Error: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 1000000000 # too big : error
Error: sch_sfq: invalid perturb period.
tc qd add dev lo root sfq perturb 2000000 # acceptable value
tc -s -d qd sh dev lo
qdisc sfq 8005: root refcnt 2 limit 127p quantum 64Kb depth 127 flows 128 divisor 1024 perturb 2000000sec
Sent 0 bytes 0 pkt (dropped 0, overlimits 0 requeues 0)
backlog 0b 0p requeues 0 |
