| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix null pointer dereference in destroy_previous_session
If client set ->PreviousSessionId on kerberos session setup stage,
NULL pointer dereference error will happen. Since sess->user is not
set yet, It can pass the user argument as NULL to destroy_previous_session.
sess->user will be set in ksmbd_krb5_authenticate(). So this patch move
calling destroy_previous_session() after ksmbd_krb5_authenticate(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix null-ptr-deref when acquiring remote ip of ethernet bearer
The reproduction steps:
1. create a tun interface
2. enable l2 bearer
3. TIPC_NL_UDP_GET_REMOTEIP with media name set to tun
tipc: Started in network mode
tipc: Node identity 8af312d38a21, cluster identity 4711
tipc: Enabled bearer <eth:syz_tun>, priority 1
Oops: general protection fault
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range
CPU: 1 UID: 1000 PID: 559 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1+ #117 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC
RIP: 0010:tipc_udp_nl_dump_remoteip+0x4a4/0x8f0
the ub was in fact a struct dev.
when bid != 0 && skip_cnt != 0, bearer_list[bid] may be NULL or
other media when other thread changes it.
fix this by checking media_id. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
calipso: Fix null-ptr-deref in calipso_req_{set,del}attr().
syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in sock_omalloc() while allocating
a CALIPSO option. [0]
The NULL is of struct sock, which was fetched by sk_to_full_sk() in
calipso_req_setattr().
Since commit a1a5344ddbe8 ("tcp: avoid two atomic ops for syncookies"),
reqsk->rsk_listener could be NULL when SYN Cookie is returned to its
client, as hinted by the leading SYN Cookie log.
Here are 3 options to fix the bug:
1) Return 0 in calipso_req_setattr()
2) Return an error in calipso_req_setattr()
3) Alaways set rsk_listener
1) is no go as it bypasses LSM, but 2) effectively disables SYN Cookie
for CALIPSO. 3) is also no go as there have been many efforts to reduce
atomic ops and make TCP robust against DDoS. See also commit 3b24d854cb35
("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood").
As of the blamed commit, SYN Cookie already did not need refcounting,
and no one has stumbled on the bug for 9 years, so no CALIPSO user will
care about SYN Cookie.
Let's return an error in calipso_req_setattr() and calipso_req_delattr()
in the SYN Cookie case.
This can be reproduced by [1] on Fedora and now connect() of nc times out.
[0]:
TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 12262 Comm: syz.1.2611 Not tainted 6.14.0 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_kmalloc+0x35/0x170 net/core/sock.c:2806
Code: 89 d5 41 54 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 25 e3 c6 fd e8 f0 91 e3 00 48 8d 7b 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b
RSP: 0018:ffff88811af89038 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888105266400
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88800c890000 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: 0000000000000050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810526640e
R10: ffffed1020a4cc81 R11: ffff88810526640f R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000820 R14: ffff888105266400 R15: 0000000000000050
FS: 00007f0653a07640(0000) GS:ffff88811af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f863ba096f4 CR3: 00000000163c0005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
ipv6_renew_options+0x279/0x950 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1288
calipso_req_setattr+0x181/0x340 net/ipv6/calipso.c:1204
calipso_req_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:597
netlbl_req_setattr+0x18a/0x440 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1249
selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request+0x1fb/0x320 security/selinux/netlabel.c:342
selinux_inet_conn_request+0x1eb/0x2c0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5551
security_inet_conn_request+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4945
tcp_v6_route_req+0x22c/0x550 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:825
tcp_conn_request+0xec8/0x2b70 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7275
tcp_v6_conn_request+0x1e3/0x440 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1328
tcp_rcv_state_process+0xafa/0x52b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6781
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x8a6/0x1a40 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1667
tcp_v6_rcv+0x505e/0x5b50 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1904
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x17c/0x1da0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:436
ip6_input_finish+0x103/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:480
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
ip6_input+0x13c/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491
dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0xb6/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netf
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sch_hfsc: make hfsc_qlen_notify() idempotent
hfsc_qlen_notify() is not idempotent either and not friendly
to its callers, like fq_codel_dequeue(). Let's make it idempotent
to ease qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() callers' life:
1. update_vf() decreases cl->cl_nactive, so we can check whether it is
non-zero before calling it.
2. eltree_remove() always removes RB node cl->el_node, but we can use
RB_EMPTY_NODE() + RB_CLEAR_NODE() to make it safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Do not double dequeue a configuration request
Some of our devices crash in tb_cfg_request_dequeue():
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000122
CPU: 6 PID: 91007 Comm: kworker/6:2 Tainted: G U W 6.6.65
RIP: 0010:tb_cfg_request_dequeue+0x2d/0xa0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? tb_cfg_request_dequeue+0x2d/0xa0
tb_cfg_request_work+0x33/0x80
worker_thread+0x386/0x8f0
kthread+0xed/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x38/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
The circumstances are unclear, however, the theory is that
tb_cfg_request_work() can be scheduled twice for a request:
first time via frame.callback from ring_work() and second
time from tb_cfg_request(). Both times kworkers will execute
tb_cfg_request_dequeue(), which results in double list_del()
from the ctl->request_queue (the list poison deference hints
at it: 0xdead000000000122).
Do not dequeue requests that don't have TB_CFG_REQUEST_ACTIVE
bit set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: marvell/cesa - Handle zero-length skcipher requests
Do not access random memory for zero-length skcipher requests.
Just return 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: fix ktls panic with sockmap
[ 2172.936997] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 2172.936999] kernel BUG at lib/iov_iter.c:629!
......
[ 2172.944996] PKRU: 55555554
[ 2172.945155] Call Trace:
[ 2172.945299] <TASK>
[ 2172.945428] ? die+0x36/0x90
[ 2172.945601] ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100
[ 2172.945795] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946031] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946267] ? do_error_trap+0x7d/0x110
[ 2172.946499] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.946736] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70
[ 2172.946961] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.947197] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 2172.947446] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180
[ 2172.947683] ? iov_iter_revert+0x5c/0x180
[ 2172.947913] tls_sw_sendmsg_locked.isra.0+0x794/0x840
[ 2172.948206] tls_sw_sendmsg+0x52/0x80
[ 2172.948420] ? inet_sendmsg+0x1f/0x70
[ 2172.948634] __sys_sendto+0x1cd/0x200
[ 2172.948848] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[ 2172.949072] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270
[ 2172.949330] ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x5e/0x170
[ 2172.949595] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[ 2172.949817] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270
[ 2172.950211] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190
[ 2172.950632] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xc2/0xd0
[ 2172.951036] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
[ 2172.951382] do_syscall_64+0x90/0x170
......
After calling bpf_exec_tx_verdict(), the size of msg_pl->sg may increase,
e.g., when the BPF program executes bpf_msg_push_data().
If the BPF program sets cork_bytes and sg.size is smaller than cork_bytes,
it will return -ENOSPC and attempt to roll back to the non-zero copy
logic. However, during rollback, msg->msg_iter is reset, but since
msg_pl->sg.size has been increased, subsequent executions will exceed the
actual size of msg_iter.
'''
iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
'''
The changes in this commit are based on the following considerations:
1. When cork_bytes is set, rolling back to non-zero copy logic is
pointless and can directly go to zero-copy logic.
2. We can not calculate the correct number of bytes to revert msg_iter.
Assume the original data is "abcdefgh" (8 bytes), and after 3 pushes
by the BPF program, it becomes 11-byte data: "abc?de?fgh?".
Then, we set cork_bytes to 6, which means the first 6 bytes have been
processed, and the remaining 5 bytes "?fgh?" will be cached until the
length meets the cork_bytes requirement.
However, some data in "?fgh?" is not within 'sg->msg_iter'
(but in msg_pl instead), especially the data "?" we pushed.
So it doesn't seem as simple as just reverting through an offset of
msg_iter.
3. For non-TLS sockets in tcp_bpf_sendmsg, when a "cork" situation occurs,
the user-space send() doesn't return an error, and the returned length is
the same as the input length parameter, even if some data is cached.
Additionally, I saw that the current non-zero-copy logic for handling
corking is written as:
'''
line 1177
else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
if (ret == -ENOSPC)
ret = 0;
goto send_end;
'''
So it's ok to just return 'copied' without error when a "cork" situation
occurs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix panic when calling skb_linearize
The panic can be reproduced by executing the command:
./bench sockmap -c 2 -p 1 -a --rx-verdict-ingress --rx-strp 100000
Then a kernel panic was captured:
'''
[ 657.460555] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2178!
[ 657.462680] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 657.463287] Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
...
[ 657.469610] <TASK>
[ 657.469738] ? die+0x36/0x90
[ 657.469916] ? do_trap+0x1d0/0x270
[ 657.470118] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.470376] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.470620] ? do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170
[ 657.470846] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.471092] ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40
[ 657.471335] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.471579] ? exc_invalid_op+0x2d/0x40
[ 657.471805] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 657.472052] ? pskb_expand_head+0xd1/0xf40
[ 657.472292] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.472540] ? lock_acquire+0x18f/0x4e0
[ 657.472766] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
[ 657.472999] ? __pfx_pskb_expand_head+0x10/0x10
[ 657.473263] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x5b/0x470
[ 657.473537] ? __pfx___lock_release.isra.0+0x10/0x10
[ 657.473826] __pskb_pull_tail+0xfd/0x1d20
[ 657.474062] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x90
[ 657.474707] sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x3bf/0x510
[ 657.475392] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[ 657.476010] sk_psock_backlog+0x5cf/0xd70
[ 657.476637] process_one_work+0x858/0x1a20
'''
The panic originates from the assertion BUG_ON(skb_shared(skb)) in
skb_linearize(). A previous commit(see Fixes tag) introduced skb_get()
to avoid race conditions between skb operations in the backlog and skb
release in the recvmsg path. However, this caused the panic to always
occur when skb_linearize is executed.
The "--rx-strp 100000" parameter forces the RX path to use the strparser
module which aggregates data until it reaches 100KB before calling sockmap
logic. The 100KB payload exceeds MAX_MSG_FRAGS, triggering skb_linearize.
To fix this issue, just move skb_get into sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue.
'''
sk_psock_backlog:
sk_psock_handle_skb
skb_get(skb) <== we move it into 'sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue'
sk_psock_skb_ingress____________
↓
|
| → sk_psock_skb_ingress_self
| sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
sk_psock_verdict_apply_________________↑ skb_linearize
'''
Note that for verdict_apply path, the skb_get operation is unnecessary so
we add 'take_ref' param to control it's behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix error flow upon firmware failure for RQ destruction
Upon RQ destruction if the firmware command fails which is the
last resource to be destroyed some SW resources were already cleaned
regardless of the failure.
Now properly rollback the object to its original state upon such failure.
In order to avoid a use-after free in case someone tries to destroy the
object again, which results in the following kernel trace:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 37589 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148
Modules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) rfkill mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) psample mlxfw(OE) mlx_compat(OE) macsec tls pci_hyperv_intf sunrpc vfat fat virtio_net net_failover failover fuse loop nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock xfs crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce virtio_console virtio_gpu virtio_blk virtio_dma_buf virtio_mmio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod xpmem(OE)
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 37589 Comm: python3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE ------- --- 6.12.0-54.el10.aarch64 #1
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148
lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148
sp : ffff80008b81b7e0
x29: ffff80008b81b7e0 x28: ffff000133d51600 x27: 0000000000000001
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000ffffffea x24: ffff00010ae80f00
x23: ffff00010ae80f80 x22: ffff0000c66e5d08 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff0000c66e0000 x19: ffff00010ae80340 x18: 0000000000000006
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: ffff80008b81b37f
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2e656572662d7265 x12: ffff80008283ef78
x11: ffff80008257efd0 x10: ffff80008283efd0 x9 : ffff80008021ed90
x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 00000000000bffe8 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff
x5 : ffff0001fb8e3408 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800179993000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000133d51600
Call trace:
refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148
mlx5_core_put_rsc+0x88/0xa0 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked+0x64/0x98 [mlx5_ib]
mlx5_ib_destroy_wq+0x34/0x80 [mlx5_ib]
ib_destroy_wq_user+0x30/0xc0 [ib_core]
uverbs_free_wq+0x28/0x58 [ib_uverbs]
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x34/0x78 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x48/0x240 [ib_uverbs]
__uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0xd4/0x1a8 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x48/0x120 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_close+0x2c/0x100 [ib_uverbs]
__fput+0xd8/0x2f0
__fput_sync+0x50/0x70
__arm64_sys_close+0x40/0x90
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x74/0xd0
do_el0_svc+0x48/0xe8
el0_svc+0x44/0x1d0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: Fix the dead loop of MPLS parse
The unexpected MPLS packet may not end with the bottom label stack.
When there are many stacks, The label count value has wrapped around.
A dead loop occurs, soft lockup/CPU stuck finally.
stack backtrace:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in /build/linux-0Pa0xK/linux-5.15.0/net/openvswitch/flow.c:662:26
index -1 is out of range for type '__be32 [3]'
CPU: 34 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/34 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-121-generic #131-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge C6420/0JP9TF, BIOS 2.12.2 07/14/2021
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
show_stack+0x52/0x5c
dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x63
dump_stack+0x10/0x16
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x36
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
key_extract_l3l4+0x82a/0x840 [openvswitch]
? kfree_skbmem+0x52/0xa0
key_extract+0x9c/0x2b0 [openvswitch]
ovs_flow_key_extract+0x124/0x350 [openvswitch]
ovs_vport_receive+0x61/0xd0 [openvswitch]
? kernel_init_free_pages.part.0+0x4a/0x70
? get_page_from_freelist+0x353/0x540
netdev_port_receive+0xc4/0x180 [openvswitch]
? netdev_port_receive+0x180/0x180 [openvswitch]
netdev_frame_hook+0x1f/0x40 [openvswitch]
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x23a/0xf00
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0xfa/0x240
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x18e/0x2a0
napi_complete_done+0x7a/0x1c0
bnxt_poll+0x155/0x1c0 [bnxt_en]
__napi_poll+0x30/0x180
net_rx_action+0x126/0x280
? bnxt_msix+0x67/0x80 [bnxt_en]
handle_softirqs+0xda/0x2d0
irq_exit_rcu+0x96/0xc0
common_interrupt+0x8e/0xa0
</IRQ> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix udp gso skb_segment after pull from frag_list
Commit a1e40ac5b5e9 ("net: gso: fix udp gso fraglist segmentation after
pull from frag_list") detected invalid geometry in frag_list skbs and
redirects them from skb_segment_list to more robust skb_segment. But some
packets with modified geometry can also hit bugs in that code. We don't
know how many such cases exist. Addressing each one by one also requires
touching the complex skb_segment code, which risks introducing bugs for
other types of skbs. Instead, linearize all these packets that fail the
basic invariants on gso fraglist skbs. That is more robust.
If only part of the fraglist payload is pulled into head_skb, it will
always cause exception when splitting skbs by skb_segment. For detailed
call stack information, see below.
Valid SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs
- consist of two or more segments
- the head_skb holds the protocol headers plus first gso_size
- one or more frag_list skbs hold exactly one segment
- all but the last must be gso_size
Optional datapath hooks such as NAT and BPF (bpf_skb_pull_data) can
modify fraglist skbs, breaking these invariants.
In extreme cases they pull one part of data into skb linear. For UDP,
this causes three payloads with lengths of (11,11,10) bytes were
pulled tail to become (12,10,10) bytes.
The skbs no longer meets the above SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST conditions because
payload was pulled into head_skb, it needs to be linearized before pass
to regular skb_segment.
skb_segment+0xcd0/0xd14
__udp_gso_segment+0x334/0x5f4
udp4_ufo_fragment+0x118/0x15c
inet_gso_segment+0x164/0x338
skb_mac_gso_segment+0xc4/0x13c
__skb_gso_segment+0xc4/0x124
validate_xmit_skb+0x9c/0x2c0
validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4c/0x80
sch_direct_xmit+0x70/0x404
__dev_queue_xmit+0x64c/0xe5c
neigh_resolve_output+0x178/0x1c4
ip_finish_output2+0x37c/0x47c
__ip_finish_output+0x194/0x240
ip_finish_output+0x20/0xf4
ip_output+0x100/0x1a0
NF_HOOK+0xc4/0x16c
ip_forward+0x314/0x32c
ip_rcv+0x90/0x118
__netif_receive_skb+0x74/0x124
process_backlog+0xe8/0x1a4
__napi_poll+0x5c/0x1f8
net_rx_action+0x154/0x314
handle_softirqs+0x154/0x4b8
[118.376811] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:bug&]kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4278!
[118.376829] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:traps&]Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[118.470774] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]Kernel Offset: 0x178cc00000 from 0xffffffc008000000
[118.470810] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]PHYS_OFFSET: 0x40000000
[118.470827] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
[118.470848] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]pc : [0xffffffd79598aefc] skb_segment+0xcd0/0xd14
[118.470900] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]lr : [0xffffffd79598a5e8] skb_segment+0x3bc/0xd14
[118.470928] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]sp : ffffffc008013770 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_set_pipapo_avx2: fix initial map fill
If the first field doesn't cover the entire start map, then we must zero
out the remainder, else we leak those bits into the next match round map.
The early fix was incomplete and did only fix up the generic C
implementation.
A followup patch adds a test case to nft_concat_range.sh. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: sch_sfq: fix a potential crash on gso_skb handling
SFQ has an assumption of always being able to queue at least one packet.
However, after the blamed commit, sch->q.len can be inflated by packets
in sch->gso_skb, and an enqueue() on an empty SFQ qdisc can be followed
by an immediate drop.
Fix sfq_drop() to properly clear q->tail in this situation.
ip netns add lb
ip link add dev to-lb type veth peer name in-lb netns lb
ethtool -K to-lb tso off # force qdisc to requeue gso_skb
ip netns exec lb ethtool -K in-lb gro on # enable NAPI
ip link set dev to-lb up
ip -netns lb link set dev in-lb up
ip addr add dev to-lb 192.168.20.1/24
ip -netns lb addr add dev in-lb 192.168.20.2/24
tc qdisc replace dev to-lb root sfq limit 100
ip netns exec lb netserver
netperf -H 192.168.20.2 -l 100 &
netperf -H 192.168.20.2 -l 100 &
netperf -H 192.168.20.2 -l 100 &
netperf -H 192.168.20.2 -l 100 & |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mdiobus: Fix potential out-of-bounds read/write access
When using publicly available tools like 'mdio-tools' to read/write data
from/to network interface and its PHY via mdiobus, there is no verification of
parameters passed to the ioctl and it accepts any mdio address.
Currently there is support for 32 addresses in kernel via PHY_MAX_ADDR define,
but it is possible to pass higher value than that via ioctl.
While read/write operation should generally fail in this case,
mdiobus provides stats array, where wrong address may allow out-of-bounds
read/write.
Fix that by adding address verification before read/write operation.
While this excludes this access from any statistics, it improves security of
read/write operation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: red: fix a race in __red_change()
Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in RED, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.
The race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
|
| [5]: lock root
| [6]: rehash
| [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
|
[4]: qdisc_put()
This can be abused to underflow a parent's qlen.
Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: ets: fix a race in ets_qdisc_change()
Gerrard Tai reported a race condition in ETS, whenever SFQ perturb timer
fires at the wrong time.
The race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
[1]: lock root
[2]: qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
[3]: unlock root
|
| [5]: lock root
| [6]: rehash
| [7]: qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog()
|
[4]: qdisc_put()
This can be abused to underflow a parent's qlen.
Calling qdisc_purge_queue() instead of qdisc_tree_flush_backlog()
should fix the race, because all packets will be purged from the qdisc
before releasing the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
VMCI: fix race between vmci_host_setup_notify and vmci_ctx_unset_notify
During our test, it is found that a warning can be trigger in try_grab_folio
as follow:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1678 at mm/gup.c:147 try_grab_folio+0x106/0x130
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1678 Comm: syz.3.31 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5 #163 PREEMPT(undef)
RIP: 0010:try_grab_folio+0x106/0x130
Call Trace:
<TASK>
follow_huge_pmd+0x240/0x8e0
follow_pmd_mask.constprop.0.isra.0+0x40b/0x5c0
follow_pud_mask.constprop.0.isra.0+0x14a/0x170
follow_page_mask+0x1c2/0x1f0
__get_user_pages+0x176/0x950
__gup_longterm_locked+0x15b/0x1060
? gup_fast+0x120/0x1f0
gup_fast_fallback+0x17e/0x230
get_user_pages_fast+0x5f/0x80
vmci_host_unlocked_ioctl+0x21c/0xf80
RIP: 0033:0x54d2cd
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Digging into the source, context->notify_page may init by get_user_pages_fast
and can be seen in vmci_ctx_unset_notify which will try to put_page. However
get_user_pages_fast is not finished here and lead to following
try_grab_folio warning. The race condition is shown as follow:
cpu0 cpu1
vmci_host_do_set_notify
vmci_host_setup_notify
get_user_pages_fast(uva, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &context->notify_page);
lockless_pages_from_mm
gup_pgd_range
gup_huge_pmd // update &context->notify_page
vmci_host_do_set_notify
vmci_ctx_unset_notify
notify_page = context->notify_page;
if (notify_page)
put_page(notify_page); // page is freed
__gup_longterm_locked
__get_user_pages
follow_trans_huge_pmd
try_grab_folio // warn here
To slove this, use local variable page to make notify_page can be seen
after finish get_user_pages_fast. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
espintcp: remove encap socket caching to avoid reference leak
The current scheme for caching the encap socket can lead to reference
leaks when we try to delete the netns.
The reference chain is: xfrm_state -> enacp_sk -> netns
Since the encap socket is a userspace socket, it holds a reference on
the netns. If we delete the espintcp state (through flush or
individual delete) before removing the netns, the reference on the
socket is dropped and the netns is correctly deleted. Otherwise, the
netns may not be reachable anymore (if all processes within the ns
have terminated), so we cannot delete the xfrm state to drop its
reference on the socket.
This patch results in a small (~2% in my tests) performance
regression.
A GC-type mechanism could be added for the socket cache, to clear
references if the state hasn't been used "recently", but it's a lot
more complex than just not caching the socket. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dma-buf: insert memory barrier before updating num_fences
smp_store_mb() inserts memory barrier after storing operation.
It is different with what the comment is originally aiming so Null
pointer dereference can be happened if memory update is reordered. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers/rapidio/rio_cm.c: prevent possible heap overwrite
In
riocm_cdev_ioctl(RIO_CM_CHAN_SEND)
-> cm_chan_msg_send()
-> riocm_ch_send()
cm_chan_msg_send() checks that userspace didn't send too much data but
riocm_ch_send() failed to check that userspace sent sufficient data. The
result is that riocm_ch_send() can write to fields in the rio_ch_chan_hdr
which were outside the bounds of the space which cm_chan_msg_send()
allocated.
Address this by teaching riocm_ch_send() to check that the entire
rio_ch_chan_hdr was copied in from userspace. |
