| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| An integer overflow vulnerability exists in the MPack Node API in MPack 1.1.1 on 32-bit platforms. When parsing a specially crafted MessagePack array32 or map32 object with an excessively large element count, the page allocation size calculation in mpack_tree_parse_children() can overflow size_t and produce an undersized allocation. Subsequent parsing writes mpack_node_data_t records beyond the allocated heap buffer, resulting in heap-buffer-overflow, memory corruption, and denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Fix integer overflow in acpi_ex_opcode_3A_1T_1R() (mid_op)
Add overflow check for Index + Length to prevent integer overflow
when calculating the truncation length. This prevents negative
size parameter being passed to memcpy(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/mm_init: deferred_grow_zone(): fix out-of-range first_deferred_pfn
With CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT enabled, deferred_grow_zone()
initializes struct pages early in boot to satisfy an allocation.
With a large CMA reservation in place, the ranges deferred_init_memmap()
finds may not add up to the allocation it was asked for, and the function
ends up initializing the memory map of the entire zone and still falls
short.
That is fine in itself: the function accounts for it and leaves the
caller to decide whether it now has enough memory.
However, the update of pgdat->first_deferred_pfn that tracks where
uninitialized memory map starts could overflow.
If the node's RAM end is not aligned on PAGES_PER_SECTION boundaries and
some deferred struct pages were initialized, pgdat->first_deferred_pfn
would point past the end of the node's memory.
deferred_init_memmap() later picks up from pgdat->first_deferred_pfn and
hits a BUG_ON(), because it expects a pfn within its node.
For example, when running a kernel with CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT=y
and CONFIG_CMA=y using the following qemu command line
qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm -m 8032M -kernel bzImage \
-append "nokaslr cma=4768M@0x100000000"
the kernel panics:
kernel BUG at mm/mm_init.c:2131!
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 36 Comm: pgdatinit0 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc6 #1
RIP: 0010:deferred_init_memmap+0x1b8/0x1c0
RAX: 0000000000236000 R13: 0000000000238000
Call Trace:
kthread+0xdf/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x187/0x250
Make sure that the update of pgdta->first_deferred_pfn does not overflow
when the entire zone's (and therefore node's) memory map is initialized.
[rppt: massaged the changelog] |
| Netdata is an open source observability tool. Prior to 2.10.4, an authenticated child agent can send an oversized DIMENSION SLOT value that str2ull_encoded passes to pluginsd_rrddim_put_to_slot in src/plugins.d/pluginsd_internals.h without an upper bound. prd_array_create in src/database/rrdset-pluginsd-array.h can then wrap the size_t allocation calculation while retaining the original large array size, causing the subsequent initialization loop to write beyond the undersized heap allocation and crash the parent agent. This issue is fixed in version 2.10.4 and nightly build 2.10.0-782-nightly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: close race between scheduler and state change
The mptcp scheduler may race with subflow sockets state change: data
transmission on the selected socket may fail and a later release could
try to use mss_now reset to 0 for a divide operation.
Address the issue by explicitly checking for the critical scenario. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: initialise args->total for parent pointer updates
xfs_parent_da_args_init() builds an xfs_da_args from a zeroed
xfs_parent_args (kmem_cache_zalloc), leaving args->total == 0.
xfs_da_grow_inode_int() treats that field as a running block reservation
and subtracts from it; because it is an xfs_extlen_t (uint32_t), the
first attr-fork growth wraps it to ~0U. That defeats the free-space
check in xfs_alloc_space_available(), and when it coincides with an AG
that has exactly zero available blocks the allocation is clamped to
maxlen 0 and returns -ENOSPC, which xfs_defer_finish_noroll() escalates
to a filesystem shutdown.
Set args->total the way the log recovery path does
(xfs_attri_recover_work(), xfs_attr_item.c:706), in the add and replace
paths that can grow the fork. Removals and lookups never grow it, so
they leave the field alone, matching that switch. |
| Null pointer dereference in Windows Universal Disk Format File System Driver (UDFS) allows an authorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| SumatraPDF 3.6.1 contains an integer overflow vulnerability in EngineMupdf::BuildPageLabelRec() when parsing PDF PageLabels /Nums entries. |
| radare2 is a UNIX-like reverse engineering framework and command-line toolset. Prior to 6.2.0, radare2's CPython bytecode .pyc marshal parser was vulnerable because the CPython marshal readers accepted a 32-bit string length without rejecting values that overflow the size-plus-one allocation. The vulnerability is triggered by opening or inspecting a crafted .pyc file through r2 or rabin2. A length of 0xffffffff wrapped the allocation to zero before the common byte reader wrote attacker-controlled data and fill bytes beyond the heap allocation. This can cause heap memory corruption and denial of service; arbitrary code execution is possible but has not been demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: Don't cast tpacket_hdr.tp_len to int in tpacket_parse_header().
syzbot reported BUG() in sock_sendmsg_nosec(). [0]
The problem is that tpacket_parse_header() casts user-provided
tpacket_hdr.tp_len, which is u32, to int.
If the length is larger than INT_MAX, the following condition
in tpacket_parse_header() passes,
if (unlikely(tp_len > size_max))
and any negative value can be returned to the caller, up to
sock_sendmsg_nosec().
The repro set tpacket_hdr.tp_len to 0xfffffdef, which is cast
to -EIOCBQUEUED (-529), triggering BUG() in sock_sendmsg_nosec().
*(uint64_t*)0x200000000008 = 0xfffffdef;
...
syscall(__NR_write, /*fd=*/r[0], /*buf=*/0x200000000000ul, /*count=*/1ul);
Let's define the local tp_len as u32 in tpacket_parse_header().
[0]:
kernel BUG at net/socket.c:803!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5628 Comm: syz-executor176 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026
RIP: 0010:sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x145/0x180 net/socket.c:803
Code: 06 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 95 e8 e8 3a 22 f8 48 89 df 4c 89 f6 4c 89 e2 4d 89 fb 2e e8 32 a5 5c 16 e9 51 ff ff ff e8 cc 3a 22 f8 90 <0f> 0b e8 c4 3a 22 f8 48 83 c3 18 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003aefb48 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89a578d4 RBX: ffff8880764c67c0 RCX: ffff88807fb23e80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffdef RDI: 00000000fffffdef
RBP: 00000000fffffdef R08: ffffc90003aef747 R09: 1ffff9200075dee8
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200075dee9 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc90003aefbc0 R15: ffffffff8aac4310
FS: 000055559101b400(0000) GS:ffff888124ce0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000200000000210 CR3: 0000000073dca000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:815 [inline]
sock_write_iter+0x2de/0x3e0 net/socket.c:1266
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline]
vfs_write+0x612/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:687
ksys_write+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f173130ecb9
Code: c0 79 93 eb d5 48 8d 7c 1d 00 eb 99 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd67e44248 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000200000000000 RCX: 00007f173130ecb9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000200000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd67e44388
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 00002000000000c0 R15: 0000000000000002
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa_sim_net: check TX pull result before RX copy
vringh_iov_pull_iotlb() returns a signed byte count. A failed TX pull is
currently added to the unsigned byte counter and then passed as a size_t
length to receive_filter() and vringh_iov_push_iotlb(). A negative error
can therefore become a large length in the RX path.
Handle non-positive pull results before every length use. Count the TX
error and complete the consumed TX descriptor with zero bytes.
I found this bug myself, though the patch was written with AI assistance. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU
This commit bounds cork->base.fragsize to IP6_MAX_MTU for UDP sockets to
avoid a possible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in
udp_set_len_short when setsockopt IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER is set to
IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO or IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over
a netdev with an unusually large MTU.
Steps to reproduce (included in the new selftest):
1. Set device MTU bigger than IP6_MAX_MTU. cork->base.fragsize will be
set to that MTU in ip6_setup_cork.
2. Set IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER to IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE or IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO. It
lets maxnonfragsize be set to device MTU (cork->fragsize) in
__ip6_append_data, rather than to IP6_MAX_MTU.
3. Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +40 bytes of
IPv6 header). Device MTU allows it (it's only one byte bigger than
IP6_MAX_MTU, and the device MTU is bigger than that).
4. The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the
16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short.
To avoid breaking sending UDP jumbograms over raw IPv6 sockets, limit
the change to UDP sockets only.
The original overflow bug with IPv6 and IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO seems to
predate git history (verified reproduction on 2.6.21), was fixed later,
and then reappeared in commit 427faee167bc ("net: ipv6: introduce
ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), which is chosen as the Fixes tag here. The
overflow with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE reproduces since its introduction in
commit 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE"). |
| A flaw was found in EAP's jboss-remoting. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach :8080 (or :9990, or :4447) and complete an Upgrade: jboss-remoting handshake can cause OOM errors that degrade requests server-wide, leading to denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb/client: validate new EOF for insert range
smb3_insert_range() does not check if the new file size
(i_size + len) is valid. This allows FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE to bypass
RLIMIT_FSIZE, exceed s_maxbytes, or produce a size outside the loff_t
range.
Use check_add_overflow() to calculate the new EOF. Validate it with
inode_newsize_ok() before modifying the file.
Reproducer, using a file on a CIFS mount:
bash -c '
FILE=/mnt/cifs/repro
trap "" SIGXFSZ
ulimit -f 3072 # RLIMIT_FSIZE = 3 MiB
# A regular write is stopped at 3 MiB.
dd if=/dev/zero of="$FILE" bs=1M count=4 status=none
stat -c "size after write: %s" "$FILE"
# Insert 2 MiB into a 2 MiB file.
truncate -s 2M "$FILE"
fallocate -i -o 0 -l 2M "$FILE"
stat -c "size after insert: %s" "$FILE"
'
Before this change, the regular write stops at the 3 MiB limit, but
insert range grows the file to 4 MiB:
dd: error writing '/mnt/cifs/repro': File too large
size after write: 3145728
size after insert: 4194304
After this change, insert range also fails at the limit and leaves the
2 MiB file unchanged:
dd: error writing '/mnt/cifs/repro': File too large
size after write: 3145728
fallocate: fallocate failed: File too large
size after insert: 2097152 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
EDAC/device_sysfs: Use kstrtouint() for poll_msec to prevent truncation
The poll_msec sysfs store file uses simple_strtoul() which accepts an unsigned
long, but the target field (poll_msec) is unsigned int. On 64-bit systems,
a value > UINT_MAX is silently truncated when stored.
Fix the mismatch by using kstrtouint() instead. This rejects values larger
than UINT_MAX at parse time, making truncation impossible. Also add a check
for value < 1 to reject the 0-delay case, which would cause the poll work to
spin without delay and consume 100% CPU. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau/dmem: fix callocated underflow on large folio split
nouveau_dmem_folio_free() drops chunk->callocated once per freed folio,
while a large (compound) device-private folio is only counted once when
it is allocated. When such a folio is split, the mm core invokes
->folio_split() (nouveau_dmem_folio_split()) once for each new
sub-folio, but the hook only fixes up the sub-folio metadata and leaves
chunk->callocated unchanged.
Each resulting sub-folio is later freed separately, so after a split
the single allocation (+1) is met by N frees (-N), leaving
chunk->callocated short by N-1. On the first split/free cycle it
underflows: WARN_ON(!chunk->callocated) fires, the unsigned counter
wraps and never returns to zero, so the chunk can no longer be
reclaimed (nouveau_dmem_fini() also warns on the leaked count).
Account for the new sub-folio in the split hook, under the same lock as
nouveau_dmem_folio_free(), so the count stays balanced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/sysfb: simpledrm: Improve stride validation
Validate the computed stride against the maximum value INT_MAX. |
| An integer overflow in the BSON document encoding component of the MongoDB Python Driver's bundled native extension may occur when a single document is built from an unusually large amount of caller-supplied data. Size arithmetic is performed in a signed 32-bit type, and the guard meant to catch the overflow is written in a form whose behavior is not defined by the C language standard. A party with no privileges who can place a very large value into data that an application encodes may, depending on how the native extension was built, cause a write outside the bounds of an allocated buffer inside the application's own process. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/umem: Be careful about boundary conditions in ib_umem_find_best_pgsz()
Several corner cases, especially important on 32 bits:
- umem->iova is u64, the function argument should pass in u64 or
iova will be truncated
- Check that the length is not too large for the iova
- Check that lengths > 4G don't overflow the GENMASK |
| Integer overflow or wraparound in Microsoft Windows Media Foundation allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
