| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: ADD_ADDR rtx: free sk if last
When an ADD_ADDR is retransmitted, the sk is held in sk_reset_timer(),
and released at the end.
If at that moment, it was the last reference being held, the sk would
not be freed. sock_put() should then be called instead of __sock_put().
But that's not enough: if it is the last reference, sock_put() will call
sk_free(), which will end up calling sk_stop_timer_sync() on the same
timer, and waiting indefinitely to finish. So it is needed to mark that
the timer is done at the end of the timer handler when it has not been
rescheduled, not to call sk_stop_timer_sync() on "itself". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: ADD_ADDR rtx: always decrease sk refcount
When an ADD_ADDR is retransmitted, the sk is held in sk_reset_timer().
It should then be released in all cases at the end.
Some (unlikely) checks were returning directly instead of calling
sock_put() to decrease the refcount. Jump to a new 'exit' label to call
__sock_put() (which will become sock_put() in the next commit) to fix
this potential leak.
While at it, drop the '!msk' check which cannot happen because it is
never reset, and explicitly mark the remaining one as "unlikely". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_counter: serialize reset with spinlock
Add a global static spinlock to serialize counter fetch+reset
operations, preventing concurrent dump-and-reset from underrunning
values.
The lock is taken before fetching the total so that two parallel
resets cannot both read the same counter values and then both
subtract them.
A global lock is used for simplicity since resets are infrequent.
If this becomes a bottleneck, it can be replaced with a per-net
lock later. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: af_key: zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports
PF_KEY export paths use `pfkey_sockaddr_size()` when reserving sockaddr
payload space, so IPv6 addresses occupy 32 bytes on the wire. However,
`pfkey_sockaddr_fill()` initializes only the first 28 bytes of
`struct sockaddr_in6`, leaving the final 4 aligned bytes uninitialized.
Not every PF_KEY message is affected. The state and policy dump builders
already zero the whole message buffer before filling the sockaddr
payloads. Keep the fix to the export paths that still append aligned
sockaddr payloads with plain `skb_put()`:
- `SADB_ACQUIRE`
- `SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING`
- `SADB_X_MIGRATE`
Fix those paths by clearing only the aligned sockaddr tail after
`pfkey_sockaddr_fill()`. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mana: Validate rx_hash_key_len
Sashiko points out that rx_hash_key_len comes from a uAPI structure and is
blindly passed to memcpy, allowing the userspace to trash kernel
memory. Bounds check it so the memcpy cannot overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels
seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() call ip6_route_input() which sets a
NOREF dst on the skb, then pass it to dst_cache_set_ip6() invoking
dst_hold() unconditionally.
On PREEMPT_RT, ksoftirqd is preemptible and a higher-priority task can
release the underlying pcpu_rt between the lookup and the caching
through a concurrent FIB lookup on a shared nexthop.
Simplified race sequence:
ksoftirqd/X higher-prio task (same CPU X)
----------- --------------------------------
seg6_input_core(,skb)/rpl_input(skb)
dst_cache_get()
-> miss
ip6_route_input(skb)
-> ip6_pol_route(,skb,flags)
[RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF in flags]
-> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh
[nhid=N route]
-> rt6_make_pcpu_route()
[creates pcpu_rt, refcount=1]
pcpu_rt->sernum = fib6_sernum
[fib6_sernum=W]
-> cmpxchg(fib6_nh.rt6i_pcpu,
NULL, pcpu_rt)
[slot was empty, store succeeds]
-> skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst)
[dst is pcpu_rt, refcount still 1]
rt_genid_bump_ipv6()
-> bumps fib6_sernum
[fib6_sernum from W to Z]
ip6_route_output()
-> ip6_pol_route()
-> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh
[nhid=N]
-> rt6_get_pcpu_route()
pcpu_rt->sernum != fib6_sernum
[W <> Z, stale]
-> prev = xchg(rt6i_pcpu, NULL)
-> dst_release(prev)
[prev is pcpu_rt,
refcount 1->0, dead]
dst = skb_dst(skb)
[dst is the dead pcpu_rt]
dst_cache_set_ip6(dst)
-> dst_hold() on dead dst
-> WARN / use-after-free
For the race to occur, ksoftirqd must be preemptible (PREEMPT_RT without
PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK) and a concurrent task must be able to release
the pcpu_rt. Shared nexthop objects provide such a path, as two routes
pointing to the same nhid share the same fib6_nh and its rt6i_pcpu
entry.
Fix seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() by calling skb_dst_force() after
ip6_route_input() to force the NOREF dst into a refcounted one before
caching.
The output path is not affected as ip6_route_output() already returns a
refcounted dst. |
| follow-redirects is an open source, drop-in replacement for Node's `http` and `https` modules that automatically follows redirects. Prior to 1.16.0, when an HTTP request follows a cross-domain redirect (301/302/307/308), follow-redirects only strips authorization, proxy-authorization, and cookie headers (matched by regex at index.js). Any custom authentication header (e.g., X-API-Key, X-Auth-Token, Api-Key, Token) is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.16.0. |
| In multiple locations, there is a possible way to bypass the cross profile intent filter due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/io-wq: re-check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT for each linked work item
commit 10dc95939817 ("io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work
run loop") fixed the obvious case where io_worker_handle_work() took one
exit-bit snapshot before draining pending work, but the fix stops one
level too early.
io_worker_handle_work() now re-checks IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT in its outer work
run loop, yet it still snapshots that bit once before processing a whole
dependent linked-work chain. If io_wq_exit_start() sets IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
after the first linked item has started, the remaining linked items can
still reuse stale do_kill = false, skip IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL, and continue
running after exit has begun.
Move the check further inside, so it covers linked items too. Note: this
is a syzbot special as it loves setting up tons of slow linked work on
weird devices like msr that take forever to read, and immediately close
the ring. Exit then takes a long time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mailbox: add sanity check for channel array
Fail gracefully if there is no channel array attached to the mailbox
controller. Otherwise the later dereference will cause an OOPS which
might not be seen because mailbox controllers might instantiate very
early. Remove the comment explaining the obvious while here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: xtables: restrict several matches to inet family
This is a partial revert of:
commit ab4f21e6fb1c ("netfilter: xtables: use NFPROTO_UNSPEC in more extensions")
to allow ipv4 and ipv6 only.
- xt_mac
- xt_owner
- xt_physdev
These extensions are not used by ebtables in userspace.
Moreover, xt_realm is only for ipv4, since dst->tclassid is ipv4
specific. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: fix missing expect put in obj eval
nft_ct_expect_obj_eval() allocates an expectation and may call
nf_ct_expect_related(), but never drops its local reference.
Add nf_ct_expect_put(exp) before return to balance allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
flow_dissector: do not dissect PPPoE PFC frames
RFC 2516 Section 7 states that Protocol Field Compression (PFC) is NOT
RECOMMENDED for PPPoE. In practice, pppd does not support negotiating
PFC for PPPoE sessions, and the flow dissector driver has assumed an
uncompressed frame until the blamed commit.
During the review process of that commit [1], support for PFC is
suggested. However, having a compressed (1-byte) protocol field means
the subsequent PPP payload is shifted by one byte, causing 4-byte
misalignment for the network header and an unaligned access exception
on some architectures.
The exception can be reproduced by sending a PPPoE PFC frame to an
ethernet interface of a MIPS board, with RPS enabled, even if no PPPoE
session is active on that interface:
$ 0 : 00000000 80c40000 00000000 85144817
$ 4 : 00000008 00000100 80a75758 81dc9bb8
$ 8 : 00000010 8087ae2c 0000003d 00000000
$12 : 000000e0 00000039 00000000 00000000
$16 : 85043240 80a75758 81dc9bb8 00006488
$20 : 0000002f 00000007 85144810 80a70000
$24 : 81d1bda0 00000000
$28 : 81dc8000 81dc9aa8 00000000 805ead08
Hi : 00009d51
Lo : 2163358a
epc : 805e91f0 __skb_flow_dissect+0x1b0/0x1b50
ra : 805ead08 __skb_get_hash_net+0x74/0x12c
Status: 11000403 KERNEL EXL IE
Cause : 40800010 (ExcCode 04)
BadVA : 85144817
PrId : 0001992f (MIPS 1004Kc)
Call Trace:
[<805e91f0>] __skb_flow_dissect+0x1b0/0x1b50
[<805ead08>] __skb_get_hash_net+0x74/0x12c
[<805ef330>] get_rps_cpu+0x1b8/0x3fc
[<805fca70>] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x324/0x364
[<805fd120>] napi_complete_done+0x68/0x2a4
[<8058de5c>] mtk_napi_rx+0x228/0xfec
[<805fd398>] __napi_poll+0x3c/0x1c4
[<805fd754>] napi_threaded_poll_loop+0x234/0x29c
[<805fd848>] napi_threaded_poll+0x8c/0xb0
[<80053544>] kthread+0x104/0x12c
[<80002bd8>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c
Code: 02d51821 1060045b 00000000 <8c640000> 3084000f 2c820005 144001a2 00042080 8e220000
To reduce the attack surface and maintain performance, do not process
PPPoE PFC frames.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: ah: account for ESN high bits in async callbacks
AH allocates its temporary auth/ICV layout differently when ESN is enabled:
the async ahash setup appends a 4-byte seqhi slot before the ICV or
auth_data area, but the async completion callbacks still reconstruct the
temporary layout as if seqhi were absent.
With an async AH implementation selected, that makes AH copy or compare
the wrong bytes on both the IPv4 and IPv6 paths. In UML repro on IPv4 AH
with ESN and forced async hmac(sha1), ping fails with 100% packet loss,
and the callback logs show the pre-fix drift:
ah4 output_done: esn=1 err=0 icv_off=20 expected_off=24
ah4 input_done: esn=1 auth_off=20 expected_auth_off=24 icv_off=32 expected_icv_off=36
Reconstruct the callback-side layout the same way the setup path built it
by skipping the ESN seqhi slot before locating the saved auth_data or ICV.
Per RFC 4302, the ESN high-order 32 bits participate in the AH ICV
computation, so the async callbacks must account for the seqhi slot.
Post-fix, the same IPv4 AH+ESN+forced-async-hmac(sha1) UML repro shows
the corrected offset (ah4 output_done: esn=1 err=0 icv_off=24
expected_off=24) and ping succeeds; net/ipv4/ah4.o and net/ipv6/ah6.o
build clean at W=1. IPv6 AH+ESN was not exercised at runtime, and the
change has not been tested against a real async hardware AH engine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: xfrm6: release dst on error in xfrm6_rcv_encap()
xfrm6_rcv_encap() performs an IPv6 route lookup when the skb does not
already have a dst attached. ip6_route_input_lookup() returns a
referenced dst entry even when the lookup resolves to an error route.
If dst->error is set, xfrm6_rcv_encap() drops the skb without attaching
the dst to the skb and without releasing the reference returned by the
lookup. Repeated packets hitting this path therefore leak dst entries.
Release the dst before jumping to the drop path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: reject zero shift in nft_bitwise
Reject zero shift operands for nft_bitwise left and right shift
expressions during initialization.
The carry propagation logic computes the carry from the adjacent 32-bit
word using BITS_PER_TYPE(u32) - shift. A zero shift operand turns this
into a 32-bit shift, which is undefined behaviour.
Reject zero shift operands in the control plane, alongside the existing
check for values greater than or equal to 32, so malformed rules never
reach the packet path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix missing brelse() in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all()
The commit c8e008b60492 ("ext4: ignore xattrs past end")
introduced a refcount leak in when block_csum is false.
ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all() calls ext4_get_inode_loc() to
get iloc.bh, but never releases it with brelse(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: icmp: validate reply type before using icmp_pointers
Extended echo replies use ICMP_EXT_ECHOREPLY as the outbound reply type.
That value is outside the range covered by icmp_pointers[], which only
describes the traditional ICMP types up to NR_ICMP_TYPES.
Avoid consulting icmp_pointers[] for reply types outside that range, and
use array_index_nospec() for the remaining in-range lookup. Normal ICMP
replies keep their existing behavior unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration
When inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates an established child socket from
a closing listener to another socket in the same SO_REUSEPORT group,
the target listener gets a new accept-queue entry via
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but that path never notifies the target
listener's waiters. A nonblocking accept() still works because it
checks the queue directly, but poll()/epoll_wait() waiters and
blocking accept() callers can also remain asleep indefinitely.
Call READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk) after a successful migration
in inet_csk_listen_stop().
However, after inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() succeeds, the ref acquired
in reuseport_migrate_sock() is effectively transferred to
nreq->rsk_listener. Another CPU can then dequeue nreq via accept()
or listener shutdown, hit reqsk_put(), and drop that listener ref.
Since listeners are SOCK_RCU_FREE, wrap the post-queue_add()
dereferences of nsk in rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), which also
covers the existing sock_net(nsk) access in that path.
The reqsk_timer_handler() path does not need the same changes for two
reasons: half-open requests become readable only after the final ACK,
where tcp_child_process() already wakes the listener; and once nreq is
visible via inet_ehash_insert(), the success path no longer touches
nsk directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: initialize nfgenmsg in NLMSG_DONE terminator
When batching multiple NFLOG messages (inst->qlen > 1), __nfulnl_send()
appends an NLMSG_DONE terminator with sizeof(struct nfgenmsg) payload via
nlmsg_put(), but never initializes the nfgenmsg bytes. The nlmsg_put()
helper only zeroes alignment padding after the payload, not the payload
itself, so four bytes of stale kernel heap data are leaked to userspace
in the NLMSG_DONE message body.
Use nfnl_msg_put() to build the NLMSG_DONE terminator, which initializes
the nfgenmsg payload via nfnl_fill_hdr(), consistent with how
__build_packet_message() already constructs NFULNL_MSG_PACKET headers. |
