| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: ptdma: Fix the error handling path in pt_core_init()
In order to free resources correctly in the error handling path of
pt_core_init(), 2 goto's have to be switched. Otherwise, some resources
will leak and we will try to release things that have not been allocated
yet.
Also move a dev_err() to a place where it is more meaningful. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: parsers: qcom: Fix missing free for pparts in cleanup
Mtdpart doesn't free pparts when a cleanup function is declared.
Add missing free for pparts in cleanup function for smem to fix the
leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Convert spinlock to mutex to lock evl workqueue
drain_workqueue() cannot be called safely in a spinlocked context due to
possible task rescheduling. In the multi-task scenario, calling
queue_work() while drain_workqueue() will lead to a Call Trace as
pushing a work on a draining workqueue is not permitted in spinlocked
context.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x7d/0x140
? __queue_work+0x2b2/0x440
? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? __queue_work+0x2b2/0x440
queue_work_on+0x28/0x30
idxd_misc_thread+0x303/0x5a0 [idxd]
? __schedule+0x369/0xb40
? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
? irq_thread+0xbc/0x1b0
irq_thread_fn+0x21/0x70
irq_thread+0x102/0x1b0
? preempt_count_add+0x74/0xa0
? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x103/0x140
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
The current implementation uses a spinlock to protect event log workqueue
and will lead to the Call Trace due to potential task rescheduling.
To address the locking issue, convert the spinlock to mutex, allowing
the drain_workqueue() to be called in a safe mutex-locked context.
This change ensures proper synchronization when accessing the event log
workqueue, preventing potential Call Trace and improving the overall
robustness of the code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: decrease MHI channel buffer length to 8KB
Currently buf_len field of ath11k_mhi_config_qca6390 is assigned
with 0, making MHI use a default size, 64KB, to allocate channel
buffers. This is likely to fail in some scenarios where system
memory is highly fragmented and memory compaction or reclaim is
not allowed.
There is a fail report which is caused by it:
kworker/u32:45: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x40c00(GFP_NOIO|__GFP_COMP), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0
CPU: 0 PID: 19318 Comm: kworker/u32:45 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-1.gae4495f-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) 493b6d5b382c603654d7a81fc3c144d59a1dfceb
Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x60
warn_alloc+0x13a/0x1b0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0xab/0x210
__alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0xd3e/0xda0
__alloc_pages+0x32d/0x350
? mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
__kmalloc_large_node+0x72/0x110
__kmalloc+0x37c/0x480
? mhi_map_single_no_bb+0x77/0xf0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
? mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
__mhi_prepare_for_transfer+0x44/0x80 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
? __pfx_____mhi_prepare_for_transfer+0x10/0x10 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
device_for_each_child+0x5c/0xa0
? __pfx_pci_pm_resume+0x10/0x10
ath11k_core_resume+0x65/0x100 [ath11k a5094e22d7223135c40d93c8f5321cf09fd85e4e]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
ath11k_pci_pm_resume+0x32/0x60 [ath11k_pci 830b7bfc3ea80ebef32e563cafe2cb55e9cc73ec]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
dpm_run_callback+0x8c/0x1e0
device_resume+0x104/0x340
? __pfx_dpm_watchdog_handler+0x10/0x10
async_resume+0x1d/0x30
async_run_entry_fn+0x32/0x120
process_one_work+0x168/0x330
worker_thread+0x2f5/0x410
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xe8/0x120
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
Actually those buffers are used only by QMI target -> host communication.
And for WCN6855 and QCA6390, the largest packet size for that is less
than 6KB. So change buf_len field to 8KB, which results in order 1
allocation if page size is 4KB. In this way, we can at least save some
memory, and as well as decrease the possibility of allocation failure
in those scenarios.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: buffer: Fix file related error handling in IIO_BUFFER_GET_FD_IOCTL
If we fail to copy the just created file descriptor to userland, we
try to clean up by putting back 'fd' and freeing 'ib'. The code uses
put_unused_fd() for the former which is wrong, as the file descriptor
was already published by fd_install() which gets called internally by
anon_inode_getfd().
This makes the error handling code leaving a half cleaned up file
descriptor table around and a partially destructed 'file' object,
allowing userland to play use-after-free tricks on us, by abusing
the still usable fd and making the code operate on a dangling
'file->private_data' pointer.
Instead of leaving the kernel in a partially corrupted state, don't
attempt to explicitly clean up and leave this to the process exit
path that'll release any still valid fds, including the one created
by the previous call to anon_inode_getfd(). Simply return -EFAULT to
indicate the error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registers
The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers
are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means
that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that
they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state.
Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it.
The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in
addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler
verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the
thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some call sites of
the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not
understood when shadow stack support was put in place.
As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with
XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to
return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an
ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack
behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That
check just happened to avoid the warning.
But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks
disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina
Schimpe:
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x6e/0x80
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? __warn+0x91/0x150
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0
? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? __pfx_ssp_get+0x10/0x10
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? ssp_get+0x52/0xa0
__regset_get+0xad/0xf0
copy_regset_to_user+0x52/0xc0
ptrace_regset+0x119/0x140
ptrace_request+0x13c/0x850
? wait_task_inactive+0x142/0x1d0
? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90
arch_ptrace+0x102/0x300
[...]
Ensure that shadow stacks are active in a thread before looking them up
in the XSAVE buffer. Since ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK and user_ssp[SHSTK_EN] are
set at the same time, the active check ensures that there will be
something to find in the XSAVE buffer.
[ dhansen: changelog/subject tweaks ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix data corruption after conversion from inline format
Commit 6dbf7bb55598 ("fs: Don't invalidate page buffers in
block_write_full_page()") uncovered a latent bug in ocfs2 conversion
from inline inode format to a normal inode format.
The code in ocfs2_convert_inline_data_to_extents() attempts to zero out
the whole cluster allocated for file data by grabbing, zeroing, and
dirtying all pages covering this cluster. However these pages are
beyond i_size, thus writeback code generally ignores these dirty pages
and no blocks were ever actually zeroed on the disk.
This oversight was fixed by commit 693c241a5f6a ("ocfs2: No need to zero
pages past i_size.") for standard ocfs2 write path, inline conversion
path was apparently forgotten; the commit log also has a reasoning why
the zeroing actually is not needed.
After commit 6dbf7bb55598, things became worse as writeback code stopped
invalidating buffers on pages beyond i_size and thus these pages end up
with clean PageDirty bit but with buffers attached to these pages being
still dirty. So when a file is converted from inline format, then
writeback triggers, and then the file is grown so that these pages
become valid, the invalid dirtiness state is preserved,
mark_buffer_dirty() does nothing on these pages (buffers are already
dirty) but page is never written back because it is clean. So data
written to these pages is lost once pages are reclaimed.
Simple reproducer for the problem is:
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 2000" -c "pwrite 2000 2000" -c "fsync" \
-c "pwrite 4000 2000" ocfs2_file
After unmounting and mounting the fs again, you can observe that end of
'ocfs2_file' has lost its contents.
Fix the problem by not doing the pointless zeroing during conversion
from inline format similarly as in the standard write path.
[[email protected]: fix whitespace, per Joseph] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Avoid crash from unnecessary IDA free
In the remove path, there is an attempt to free the aux_idx IDA whether
it was allocated or not. This can potentially cause a crash when
unloading the driver on systems that do not initialize support for RDMA.
But, this free cannot be gated by the status bit for RDMA, since it is
allocated if the driver detects support for RDMA at probe time, but the
driver can enter into a state where RDMA is not supported after the IDA
has been allocated at probe time and this would lead to a memory leak.
Initialize aux_idx to an invalid value and check for a valid value when
unloading to determine if an IDA free is necessary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: uclogic: Fix user-memory-access bug in uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks()
When CONFIG_HID_UCLOGIC=y and CONFIG_KUNIT_ALL_TESTS=y, launch kernel and
then the below user-memory-access bug occurs.
In hid_test_uclogic_params_cleanup_event_hooks(),it call
uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks() with the first arg=NULL, so
when it calls uclogic_params_ugee_v2_has_battery(), the hid_get_drvdata()
will access hdev->dev with hdev=NULL, which will cause below
user-memory-access.
So add a fake_device with quirks member and call hid_set_drvdata()
to assign hdev->dev->driver_data which avoids the null-ptr-def bug
for drvdata->quirks in uclogic_params_ugee_v2_has_battery(). After applying
this patch, the below user-memory-access bug never occurs.
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000329: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000000001948-0x000000000000194f]
CPU: 5 PID: 2189 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G B W N 6.6.0-rc2+ #30
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x87/0x600
Code: f3 f3 65 48 8b 14 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 54 24 60 31 d2 48 89 fa c7 44 24 30 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 28 02 f8 02 01 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 2c 04 00 00 48 8b 9d 48 19 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00
RSP: 0000:ffff88810679fc88 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000329 RSI: ffff88810679fd88 RDI: 0000000000001948
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1020f639f0
R10: ffff888107b1cf87 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 1ffff11020cf3f92
R13: ffff88810679fd88 R14: ffff888100b97b08 R15: ffff8881030bb080
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888119e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000005286001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
DR0: ffffffff8fdd6cf4 DR1: ffffffff8fdd6cf5 DR2: ffffffff8fdd6cf6
DR3: ffffffff8fdd6cf7 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0
? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
? uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x87/0x600
? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x550
? uclogic_parse_ugee_v2_desc_gen_params+0x70/0x70
? load_balance+0x2950/0x2950
? rcu_trc_cmpxchg_need_qs+0x67/0xa0
hid_test_uclogic_params_cleanup_event_hooks+0x9e/0x1a0
? uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x600/0x600
? __switch_to+0x5cf/0xe60
? migrate_enable+0x260/0x260
? __kthread_parkme+0x83/0x150
? kunit_try_run_case_cleanup+0xe0/0xe0
kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x4a/0x90
? kunit_try_catch_throw+0x80/0x80
kthread+0x2b5/0x380
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x87/0x600
Code: f3 f3 65 48 8b 14 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 54 24 60 31 d2 48 89 fa c7 44 24 30 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 28 02 f8 02 01 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 2c 04 00 00 48 8b 9d 48 19 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00
RSP: 0000:ffff88810679fc88 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000329 RSI: ffff88810679fd88 RDI: 0000000000001948
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1020f639f0
R10: ffff888107b1cf87 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 1ffff11020cf3f92
R13: ffff88810679fd88 R14: ffff888100b97b08 R15: ffff8881030bb080
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888119e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000005286001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
DR0: ffffffff8fdd6cf4 DR1:
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
llc: verify mac len before reading mac header
LLC reads the mac header with eth_hdr without verifying that the skb
has an Ethernet header.
Syzbot was able to enter llc_rcv on a tun device. Tun can insert
packets without mac len and with user configurable skb->protocol
(passing a tun_pi header when not configuring IFF_NO_PI).
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in llc_station_ac_send_test_r net/llc/llc_station.c:81 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in llc_station_rcv+0x6fb/0x1290 net/llc/llc_station.c:111
llc_station_ac_send_test_r net/llc/llc_station.c:81 [inline]
llc_station_rcv+0x6fb/0x1290 net/llc/llc_station.c:111
llc_rcv+0xc5d/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:218
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5523 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5637
netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5723 [inline]
netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5782
tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555
tun_get_user+0x54c5/0x69c0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002
Add a mac_len test before all three eth_hdr(skb) calls under net/llc.
There are further uses in include/net/llc_pdu.h. All these are
protected by a test skb->protocol == ETH_P_802_2. Which does not
protect against this tun scenario.
But the mac_len test added in this patch in llc_fixup_skb will
indirectly protect those too. That is called from llc_rcv before any
other LLC code.
It is tempting to just add a blanket mac_len check in llc_rcv, but
not sure whether that could break valid LLC paths that do not assume
an Ethernet header. 802.2 LLC may be used on top of non-802.3
protocols in principle. The below referenced commit shows that used
to, on top of Token Ring.
At least one of the three eth_hdr uses goes back to before the start
of git history. But the one that syzbot exercises is introduced in
this commit. That commit is old enough (2008), that effectively all
stable kernels should receive this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Fix shift out-of-bounds issue
[ 567.613292] shift exponent 255 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
[ 567.614498] CPU: 5 PID: 238 Comm: kworker/5:1 Tainted: G OE 6.2.0-34-generic #34~22.04.1-Ubuntu
[ 567.614502] Hardware name: AMD Splinter/Splinter-RPL, BIOS WS43927N_871 09/25/2023
[ 567.614504] Workqueue: events send_exception_work_handler [amdgpu]
[ 567.614748] Call Trace:
[ 567.614750] <TASK>
[ 567.614753] dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70
[ 567.614761] dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[ 567.614763] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x156/0x310
[ 567.614769] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ 567.614773] ? update_sd_lb_stats.constprop.0+0xf2/0x3c0
[ 567.614780] svm_range_split_by_granularity.cold+0x2b/0x34 [amdgpu]
[ 567.615047] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ 567.615052] svm_migrate_to_ram+0x185/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[ 567.615286] do_swap_page+0x7b6/0xa30
[ 567.615291] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[ 567.615294] ? __free_pages+0x119/0x130
[ 567.615299] handle_pte_fault+0x227/0x280
[ 567.615303] __handle_mm_fault+0x3c0/0x720
[ 567.615311] handle_mm_fault+0x119/0x330
[ 567.615314] ? lock_mm_and_find_vma+0x44/0x250
[ 567.615318] do_user_addr_fault+0x1a9/0x640
[ 567.615323] exc_page_fault+0x81/0x1b0
[ 567.615328] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
[ 567.615332] RIP: 0010:__get_user_8+0x1c/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix gart.bo pin_count leak
gmc_v{9,10}_0_gart_disable() isn't called matched with
correspoding gart_enbale function in SRIOV case. This will
lead to gart.bo pin_count leak on driver unload. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: acpi: fix resource leak in reconfiguration device addition
acpi_i2c_find_adapter_by_handle() calls bus_find_device() which takes a
reference on the adapter which is never released which will result in a
reference count leak and render the adapter unremovable. Make sure to
put the adapter after creating the client in the same manner that we do
for OF.
[wsa: fixed title] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: Fix freeing of uninitialized misc IRQ vector
When VSI set up failed in i40e_probe() as part of PF switch set up
driver was trying to free misc IRQ vectors in
i40e_clear_interrupt_scheme and produced a kernel Oops:
Trying to free already-free IRQ 266
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1731 __free_irq+0x9a/0x300
Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
RIP: 0010:__free_irq+0x9a/0x300
Call Trace:
? synchronize_irq+0x3a/0xa0
free_irq+0x2e/0x60
i40e_clear_interrupt_scheme+0x53/0x190 [i40e]
i40e_probe.part.108+0x134b/0x1a40 [i40e]
? kmem_cache_alloc+0x158/0x1c0
? acpi_ut_update_ref_count.part.1+0x8e/0x345
? acpi_ut_update_object_reference+0x15e/0x1e2
? strstr+0x21/0x70
? irq_get_irq_data+0xa/0x20
? mp_check_pin_attr+0x13/0xc0
? irq_get_irq_data+0xa/0x20
? mp_map_pin_to_irq+0xd3/0x2f0
? acpi_register_gsi_ioapic+0x93/0x170
? pci_conf1_read+0xa4/0x100
? pci_bus_read_config_word+0x49/0x70
? do_pci_enable_device+0xcc/0x100
local_pci_probe+0x41/0x90
work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20
process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
worker_thread+0x1cf/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x112/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
The problem is that at that point misc IRQ vectors
were not allocated yet and we get a call trace
that driver is trying to free already free IRQ vectors.
Add a check in i40e_clear_interrupt_scheme for __I40E_MISC_IRQ_REQUESTED
PF state before calling i40e_free_misc_vector. This state is set only if
misc IRQ vectors were properly initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (mlxreg-fan) Return non-zero value when fan current state is enforced from sysfs
Fan speed minimum can be enforced from sysfs. For example, setting
current fan speed to 20 is used to enforce fan speed to be at 100%
speed, 19 - to be not below 90% speed, etcetera. This feature provides
ability to limit fan speed according to some system wise
considerations, like absence of some replaceable units or high system
ambient temperature.
Request for changing fan minimum speed is configuration request and can
be set only through 'sysfs' write procedure. In this situation value of
argument 'state' is above nominal fan speed maximum.
Return non-zero code in this case to avoid
thermal_cooling_device_stats_update() call, because in this case
statistics update violates thermal statistics table range.
The issues is observed in case kernel is configured with option
CONFIG_THERMAL_STATISTICS.
Here is the trace from KASAN:
[ 159.506659] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in thermal_cooling_device_stats_update+0x7d/0xb0
[ 159.516016] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888116163840 by task hw-management.s/7444
[ 159.545625] Call Trace:
[ 159.548366] dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
[ 159.552084] ? thermal_cooling_device_stats_update+0x7d/0xb0
[ 159.635869] thermal_zone_device_update+0x345/0x780
[ 159.688711] thermal_zone_device_set_mode+0x7d/0xc0
[ 159.694174] mlxsw_thermal_modules_init+0x48f/0x590 [mlxsw_core]
[ 159.700972] ? mlxsw_thermal_set_cur_state+0x5a0/0x5a0 [mlxsw_core]
[ 159.731827] mlxsw_thermal_init+0x763/0x880 [mlxsw_core]
[ 160.070233] RIP: 0033:0x7fd995909970
[ 160.074239] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 28 d5 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 99 2d 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ..
[ 160.095242] RSP: 002b:00007fff54f5d938 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 160.103722] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000013 RCX: 00007fd995909970
[ 160.111710] RDX: 0000000000000013 RSI: 0000000001906008 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 160.119699] RBP: 0000000001906008 R08: 00007fd995bc9760 R09: 00007fd996210700
[ 160.127687] R10: 0000000000000073 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000013
[ 160.135673] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007fd995bc8600 R15: 0000000000000013
[ 160.143671]
[ 160.145338] Allocated by task 2924:
[ 160.149242] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
[ 160.153541] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0xa0
[ 160.157743] __kmalloc+0x1a2/0x2b0
[ 160.161552] thermal_cooling_device_setup_sysfs+0xf9/0x1a0
[ 160.167687] __thermal_cooling_device_register+0x1b5/0x500
[ 160.173833] devm_thermal_of_cooling_device_register+0x60/0xa0
[ 160.180356] mlxreg_fan_probe+0x474/0x5e0 [mlxreg_fan]
[ 160.248140]
[ 160.249807] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888116163400
[ 160.249807] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
[ 160.263814] The buggy address is located 64 bytes to the right of
[ 160.263814] 1024-byte region [ffff888116163400, ffff888116163800)
[ 160.277536] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 160.282898] page:0000000012275840 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888116167000 pfn:0x116160
[ 160.294872] head:0000000012275840 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 160.303251] flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2)
[ 160.309694] raw: 0200000000010200 ffffea00046f7208 ffffea0004928208 ffff88810004dbc0
[ 160.318367] raw: ffff888116167000 00000000000a0006 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 160.327033] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 160.333270]
[ 160.334937] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 160.356469] >ffff888116163800: fc .. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cma: Fix listener leak in rdma_cma_listen_on_all() failure
If cma_listen_on_all() fails it leaves the per-device ID still on the
listen_list but the state is not set to RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND.
When the cmid is eventually destroyed cma_cancel_listens() is not called
due to the wrong state, however the per-device IDs are still holding the
refcount preventing the ID from being destroyed, thus deadlocking:
task:rping state:D stack: 0 pid:19605 ppid: 47036 flags:0x00000084
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x29a/0x780
? free_unref_page_commit+0x9b/0x110
schedule+0x3c/0xa0
schedule_timeout+0x215/0x2b0
? __flush_work+0x19e/0x1e0
wait_for_completion+0x8d/0xf0
_destroy_id+0x144/0x210 [rdma_cm]
ucma_close_id+0x2b/0x40 [rdma_ucm]
__destroy_id+0x93/0x2c0 [rdma_ucm]
? __xa_erase+0x4a/0xa0
ucma_destroy_id+0x9a/0x120 [rdma_ucm]
ucma_write+0xb8/0x130 [rdma_ucm]
vfs_write+0xb4/0x250
ksys_write+0xb5/0xd0
? syscall_trace_enter.isra.19+0x123/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Ensure that cma_listen_on_all() atomically unwinds its action under the
lock during error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests
The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice
on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the
work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution
background request cannot be active twice.
CPU 1 CPU 2
rdma_resolve_addr():
RDMA_CM_IDLE -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY
rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) #1
process_one_req(): for #1
addr_handler():
RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND
mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
[.. handler still running ..]
rdma_resolve_addr():
RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY
rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler)
!! two requests are now on the req_list
rdma_destroy_id():
destroy_id_handler_unlock():
_destroy_id():
cma_cancel_operation():
rdma_addr_cancel()
// process_one_req() self removes it
spin_lock_bh(&lock);
cancel_delayed_work(&req->work);
if (!list_empty(&req->list)) == true
! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done
kfree(id_priv)
process_one_req(): for #2
addr_handler():
mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
!! Use after free on id_priv
rdma_addr_cancel() expects there to be one req on the list and only
cancels the first one. The self-removal behavior of the work only happens
after the handler has returned. This yields a situations where the
req_list can have two reqs for the same "handle" but rdma_addr_cancel()
only cancels the first one.
The second req remains active beyond rdma_destroy_id() and will
use-after-free id_priv once it inevitably triggers.
Fix this by remembering if the id_priv has called rdma_resolve_ip() and
always cancel before calling it again. This ensures the req_list never
gets more than one item in it and doesn't cost anything in the normal flow
that never uses this strange error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Fix RPC client cleaned up the freed pipefs dentries
RPC client pipefs dentries cleanup is in separated rpc_remove_pipedir()
workqueue,which takes care about pipefs superblock locking.
In some special scenarios, when kernel frees the pipefs sb of the
current client and immediately alloctes a new pipefs sb,
rpc_remove_pipedir function would misjudge the existence of pipefs
sb which is not the one it used to hold. As a result,
the rpc_remove_pipedir would clean the released freed pipefs dentries.
To fix this issue, rpc_remove_pipedir should check whether the
current pipefs sb is consistent with the original pipefs sb.
This error can be catched by KASAN:
=========================================================
[ 250.497700] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dget_parent+0x195/0x200
[ 250.498315] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800a2ab804 by task kworker/0:18/106503
[ 250.500549] Workqueue: events rpc_free_client_work
[ 250.501001] Call Trace:
[ 250.502880] kasan_report+0xb6/0xf0
[ 250.503209] ? dget_parent+0x195/0x200
[ 250.503561] dget_parent+0x195/0x200
[ 250.503897] ? __pfx_rpc_clntdir_depopulate+0x10/0x10
[ 250.504384] rpc_rmdir_depopulate+0x1b/0x90
[ 250.504781] rpc_remove_client_dir+0xf5/0x150
[ 250.505195] rpc_free_client_work+0xe4/0x230
[ 250.505598] process_one_work+0x8ee/0x13b0
...
[ 22.039056] Allocated by task 244:
[ 22.039390] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[ 22.039758] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[ 22.040109] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x59/0x70
[ 22.040487] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0xf0/0x240
[ 22.040889] __d_alloc+0x31/0x8e0
[ 22.041207] d_alloc+0x44/0x1f0
[ 22.041514] __rpc_lookup_create_exclusive+0x11c/0x140
[ 22.041987] rpc_mkdir_populate.constprop.0+0x5f/0x110
[ 22.042459] rpc_create_client_dir+0x34/0x150
[ 22.042874] rpc_setup_pipedir_sb+0x102/0x1c0
[ 22.043284] rpc_client_register+0x136/0x4e0
[ 22.043689] rpc_new_client+0x911/0x1020
[ 22.044057] rpc_create_xprt+0xcb/0x370
[ 22.044417] rpc_create+0x36b/0x6c0
...
[ 22.049524] Freed by task 0:
[ 22.049803] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[ 22.050165] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[ 22.050520] kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x50
[ 22.050921] __kasan_slab_free+0x10e/0x1a0
[ 22.051306] kmem_cache_free+0xa5/0x390
[ 22.051667] rcu_core+0x62c/0x1930
[ 22.051995] __do_softirq+0x165/0x52a
[ 22.052347]
[ 22.052503] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 22.052952] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50
[ 22.053313] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x8e/0xa0
[ 22.053739] __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x6b/0x8b0
[ 22.054209] dentry_free+0xb2/0x140
[ 22.054540] __dentry_kill+0x3be/0x540
[ 22.054900] shrink_dentry_list+0x199/0x510
[ 22.055293] shrink_dcache_parent+0x190/0x240
[ 22.055703] do_one_tree+0x11/0x40
[ 22.056028] shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x61/0x140
[ 22.056461] generic_shutdown_super+0x70/0x590
[ 22.056879] kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60
[ 22.057234] rpc_kill_sb+0x121/0x200 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvlan: add ipvlan_route_v6_outbound() helper
Inspired by syzbot reports using a stack of multiple ipvlan devices.
Reduce stack size needed in ipvlan_process_v6_outbound() by moving
the flowi6 struct used for the route lookup in an non inlined
helper. ipvlan_route_v6_outbound() needs 120 bytes on the stack,
immediately reclaimed.
Also make sure ipvlan_process_v4_outbound() is not inlined.
We might also have to lower MAX_NEST_DEV, because only syzbot uses
setups with more than four stacked devices.
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc9000e803ff8 (stack is ffffc9000e804000..ffffc9000e808000)
stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 13442 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.52-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023
RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x4/0x2a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:188
Code: 48 01 c6 48 89 c7 e8 db 4e c1 03 31 c0 5d c3 cc 0f 0b eb 02 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff 5d c3 cc 00 00 cc cc 00 00 cc cc 55 48 89 e5 <41> 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 b0 01 48 85 f6 0f 84 a4 01 00 00 48 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e804000 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff817e5bf2
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff887c6568
RBP: ffffc9000e804000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: 1ffff92001d0080c
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffff87e6b100 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fd0c55826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881f6800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc9000e803ff8 CR3: 0000000170ef7000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<#DF>
</#DF>
<TASK>
[<ffffffff81f281d1>] __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/shadow.c:31
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:72 [inline]
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] cpumask_test_cpu include/linux/cpumask.h:506 [inline]
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] cpu_online include/linux/cpumask.h:1092 [inline]
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] trace_lock_acquire include/trace/events/lock.h:24 [inline]
[<ffffffff817e5bf2>] lock_acquire+0xe2/0x590 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5632
[<ffffffff8563221e>] rcu_lock_acquire+0x2e/0x40 include/linux/rcupdate.h:306
[<ffffffff8561464d>] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline]
[<ffffffff8561464d>] ip6_pol_route+0x15d/0x1440 net/ipv6/route.c:2221
[<ffffffff85618120>] ip6_pol_route_output+0x50/0x80 net/ipv6/route.c:2606
[<ffffffff856f65b5>] pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:584 [inline]
[<ffffffff856f65b5>] fib6_rule_lookup+0x265/0x620 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:116
[<ffffffff85618009>] ip6_route_output_flags_noref+0x2d9/0x3a0 net/ipv6/route.c:2638
[<ffffffff8561821a>] ip6_route_output_flags+0xca/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2651
[<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:100 [inline]
[<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:473 [inline]
[<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline]
[<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline]
[<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xc33/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677
[<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229
[<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline]
[<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline]
[<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660
[<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324
[<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline]
[<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline]
[<f
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/region: Do not try to cleanup after cxl_region_setup_targets() fails
Commit 5e42bcbc3fef ("cxl/region: decrement ->nr_targets on error in
cxl_region_attach()") tried to avoid 'eiw' initialization errors when
->nr_targets exceeded 16, by just decrementing ->nr_targets when
cxl_region_setup_targets() failed.
Commit 86987c766276 ("cxl/region: Cleanup target list on attach error")
extended that cleanup to also clear cxled->pos and p->targets[pos]. The
initialization error was incidentally fixed separately by:
Commit 8d4285425714 ("cxl/region: Fix port setup uninitialized variable
warnings") which was merged a few days after 5e42bcbc3fef.
But now the original cleanup when cxl_region_setup_targets() fails
prevents endpoint and switch decoder resources from being reused:
1) the cleanup does not set the decoder's region to NULL, which results
in future dpa_size_store() calls returning -EBUSY
2) the decoder is not properly freed, which results in future commit
errors associated with the upstream switch
Now that the initialization errors were fixed separately, the proper
cleanup for this case is to just return immediately. Then the resources
associated with this target get cleanup up as normal when the failed
region is deleted.
The ->nr_targets decrement in the error case also helped prevent
a p->targets[] array overflow, so add a new check to prevent against
that overflow.
Tested by trying to create an invalid region for a 2 switch * 2 endpoint
topology, and then following up with creating a valid region. |
