| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Previously, CVE-2024-45337 fixed an authorization bypass for misused ssh server configurations; if any other type of callback is passed other than public key, then the source-address validation would be skipped. |
| Pathological inputs could cause DoS through consumePhrase when parsing an email address according to RFC 5322. |
| A malicious SSH peer could send unsolicited global request responses to fill an internal buffer, blocking the connection's read loop. The blocked goroutine could not be released by calling Close(), resulting in a resource leak per connection. Unsolicited global responses are now discarded. |
| When an SSH server authentication callback returned PartialSuccessError with non-nil Permissions, those permissions were silently discarded, potentially dropping certificate restrictions such as force-command after a second factor succeeded. Returning non-nil Permissions with PartialSuccessError now results in a connection error. |
| The ToASCII and ToUnicode functions incorrectly accept Punycode-encoded labels that decode to an ASCII-only label. For example, ToUnicode("xn--example-.com") incorrectly returns the name "example.com" rather than an error. This behavior can lead to privilege escalation in programs using the idna package. For example, a program which performs privilege checks on the ASCII hostname may reject "example.com" but permit "xn--example-.com". If that program subsequently converts the ASCII hostname to Unicode, it will inadvertently permits access to the Unicode name "example.com". |
| Well-crafted inputs reaching ParseAddress, ParseAddressList, and ParseDate were able to trigger excessive CPU exhaustion and memory allocations. |
| When using LookupCNAME with the cgo DNS resolver, a very long CNAME response can trigger a double-free of C memory and a crash. |
| When verifying a certificate chain containing excluded DNS constraints, these constraints are not correctly applied to wildcard DNS SANs which use a different case than the constraint. This only affects validation of otherwise trusted certificate chains, issued by a root CA in the VerifyOptions.Roots CertPool, or in the system certificate pool. |
| If one side of the TLS connection sends multiple key update messages post-handshake in a single record, the connection can deadlock, causing uncontrolled consumption of resources. This can lead to a denial of service. This only affects TLS 1.3. |
| During chain building, the amount of work that is done is not correctly limited when a large number of intermediate certificates are passed in VerifyOptions.Intermediates, which can lead to a denial of service. This affects both direct users of crypto/x509 and users of crypto/tls. |
| When verifying a certificate chain which contains a certificate containing multiple email address constraints which share common local portions but different domain portions, these constraints will not be properly applied, and only the last constraint will be considered. |
| url.Parse insufficiently validated the host/authority component and accepted some invalid URLs. |
| The net/url package does not set a limit on the number of query parameters in a query. While the maximum size of query parameters in URLs is generally limited by the maximum request header size, the net/http.Request.ParseForm method can parse large URL-encoded forms. Parsing a large form containing many unique query parameters can cause excessive memory consumption. |
| A malicious GOPROXY was previously capable of forging up to two sumdb tiles that allow for a requested module to bypass the GOSUMDB check and persist attacker-controlled module content to a local Go module cache. This attack allows for a malicious GOPROXY to serve malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log. All tiles are now correctly verified against their parents. In order to determine if you have been affected: rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ && go mod tidy |
| A malicious GOSUMDB was capable of serving arbitrary module content not contained within the transparency log. This attack allows for a coordinating GOPROXY and GOSUMDB to serve a client malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log. In order to determine if you have been affected: rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ && go mod tidy |
| Parsing an invalid SVCB or HTTPS RR can panic when the size of a parameter value overflows the message buffer. |
| Previously, a revoked 'SignatureKey' belonging to a CA was not correctly checked for revocation. Now, both the 'key' and 'key.SignatureKey' are checked for @revoked. |
| SSH servers which use CertChecker as a public key callback without setting IsUserAuthority or IsHostAuthority could be caused to panic by a client presenting a certificate. CertChecker now returns an error instead of panicking when these callbacks are nil. |
| The RSA and DSA public key parsers did not enforce size limits on key parameters. A crafted public key with an excessively large modulus or DSA parameter could cause several minutes of CPU consumption during signature verification. This could be triggered by unauthenticated clients during public key authentication. RSA moduli are now limited to 8192 bits, and DSA parameters are validated per FIPS 186-2. |
| When processing HTTP/2 SETTINGS frames, transport will enter an infinite loop of writing CONTINUATION frames if it receives a SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE with a value of 0. |
