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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68793 | 1 Microsoft | 12 365, 365 Apps, Excel and 9 more | 2026-08-14 | 7.8 High |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55402 | 1 Absolute | 1 Secure Access | 2026-08-14 | N/A |
| CVE-2026-55402 is an out of bounds read vulnerability in Secure Access servers prior to version 14.57. Attackers with an ‘in the middle’ position can send specially crafted data to a server causing a persistent denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68125 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the AEAD request as assoclen += datalen - authlen; where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that only spans the real frame. The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction. Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68402 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read when checking non-inheritance cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the candidate element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension non-inheritance list. It does so after testing elem->id, but without verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length extension element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it read one octet past the end of the element. _ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a frame once a non-inheritance context exists -- e.g. while parsing a per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response, or a non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds read during element parsing: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited Read of size 1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists. The bug was found by fuzzing ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68453 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Fix buffer over-read in cca_cipher2protkey Add validation of both the actual key buffer size and token length fields in all the cca_check_sec*token() functions. Additionally check in cca_gencipherkey() for possible underflow with returned key size. The CCA token structures contain user-controlled len fields that were used in operations without proper validation against both the actual buffer size and minimum token structure size. An attacker could set this field larger than the actual buffer size, leading to reading beyond buffer boundaries. This may result in a kernel crash or exposure of memory via sending this as part of a request down to the crypto card. Also an attacker could have used a very small len value and thus enforce a buffer under-run which may produce similar effects as a over-read. So now a key must - key buf length must be at least sizeof the token struct - the key len field inside the token must fit into the range of sizeof key token struct ... key buf length | ||||
| CVE-2026-68255 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-14 | 7.7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: bound EDID block reads to the response buffer virtio_get_edid_block() validates the read offset only against the device-supplied resp->size field, never against the fixed-size resp->edid array. The EDID block index is driven by the device-supplied extension count, so a malicious virtio-gpu backend can advertise a large size together with a high block count and read far past the array into adjacent kernel memory, which is then surfaced in the parsed EDID (an out-of-bounds read / info leak). Also reject any read whose end exceeds the size of the edid array. Conforming EDID responses stay within the array and are unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68447 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: clamp v9 CRIU control stack checkpoint copy to BO size CRIU checkpoint copies the MQD control stack using cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size from hardware without bounding it to the allocated BO region. If the HW field is larger than the queue's control stack allocation, memcpy reads past the BO into adjacent GTT memory and can leak kernel data to userspace. Store the page-aligned control stack BO size in mqd_manager and clamp checkpoint copies and reported checkpoint sizes to min(cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size, mm->ctl_stack_size). Apply the same bound for multi-XCC v9.4.3 checkpoint layout. (cherry picked from commit 6c2abd0ec09e86c6323010673766f76050e28aa3) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68433 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 8.6 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received. A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier message, causing an uninitialized memory read. Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that were actually read from the wire. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68431 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate minimum PDU size for transform requests The receive path applies the minimum SMB2 PDU size check only when ProtocolId is SMB2_PROTO_NUMBER. A packet carrying SMB2_TRANSFORM_PROTO_NUM bypasses the check even when the negotiated dialect does not provide transform handling. On an SMB 2.1 connection, a short transform packet therefore reaches init_smb2_rsp_hdr(), which interprets the request as a full SMB2 header and reads beyond the request allocation. The copied fields can then be returned to the unauthenticated client. Compression transforms are converted to ordinary SMB2 messages before protocol validation. After that conversion, validate ordinary SMB2 requests against SMB2_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE and require encryption transform requests to contain both a transform header and an SMB2 header. This rejects truncated requests before work allocation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68420 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: reject optional IPTFS templates in outbound policies syzbot reported a stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find() which flows from xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(). Commit 3d776e31c841 ("xfrm: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode templates in outbound policies") disallowed optional tunnel and BEET in outbound policies to prevent this. Later when IPTFS added, it was not covered by that fix and can still trigger the out-of-bounds read; Extend the check to disallow optional IPTFS in outbound policies as well. IPTFS should be identical to tunnel mode. IN and FWD policies are not affected: xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one() is only reachable via the outbound path. Reproducer, before: ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link set dummy0 up ip addr add 10.1.1.1/24 dev dummy0 ip xfrm policy add src 10.1.1.1/32 dst 10.1.1.2/32 dir out tmpl src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid 1 mode iptfs level use tmpl src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid 2 mode transport ping -W 1 -c 1 10.1.1.2 PING 10.1.1.2 (10.1.1.2) 56(84) bytes of data. [ 64.168420] ================================================================== [ 64.169977] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170 [ 64.169977] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800e1ffd20 by task ping/2844 [ 64.169977] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 2844 Comm: ping Not tainted 7.1.0-rc7-00180-geb23b588430a #98 PREEMPT(full) [ 64.169977] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 64.169977] Call Trace: [ 64.169977] <TASK> [ 64.169977] dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70 [ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170 [ 64.169977] print_report+0x152/0x4b0 [ 64.169977] ? ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x6d/0xa0 [ 64.169977] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 64.169977] ? rcu_read_unlock_sched+0xa/0x20 [ 64.169977] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21b/0x230 [ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170 [ 64.169977] kasan_report+0xa8/0xd0 [ 64.169977] ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170 [ 64.169977] __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170 [ 64.169977] __xfrm_dst_hash+0x24/0xc0 [ 64.169977] xfrm_state_find+0xa2d/0x2f90 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_state_find+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x210/0x570 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? kernel_text_address+0x5b/0x80 [ 64.169977] ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30 [ 64.169977] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5e/0x90 [ 64.169977] ? arch_stack_walk+0x8c/0xe0 [ 64.169977] xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x130/0x200 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup_rcu+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0xb2/0x110 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx___refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0xd5/0x310 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x3d8/0xb80 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? ip_route_output_key_hash+0xc6/0x110 [ 64.169977] ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 [ 64.169977] xfrm_lookup_route+0x18/0xe0 [ 64.169977] ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x4c9/0x530 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x71/0xc0 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] release_sock+0xb0/0x170 [ 64.169977] udp_connect+0x43/0x50 [ 64.169977] __sys_connect+0xa6/0x100 [ 64.169977] ? alloc_fd+0x2e9/0x300 [ 64.169977] ? __pfx___sys_connect+0x10/0x10 [ 64.169977] ? preempt_latency ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-68373 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: at76c50x-usb: avoid length underflow in at76_guess_freq() at76_guess_freq() checks only that the received frame is at least a bare 802.11 header (24 bytes) before subtracting the fixed management-body offset: len -= el_off; For both beacon and probe response frames, el_off is 36. If the frame is shorter than el_off, subtracting it causes the calculated IE length to wrap. The length is eventually passed to cfg80211_find_elem_match() as a very large unsigned value, so the element walk runs beyond the RX skb. This path is reached from at76_rx_tasklet() while scanning. If the device delivers a truncated beacon or probe response, the oversized IE length causes an out-of-bounds read during scanning. Skip the IE lookup if the frame does not reach the variable elements, before subtracting el_off. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68353 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath6kl: fix OOB read from firmware num_msg in TX complete handler The firmware-controlled num_msg field (u8, 0-255) drives the loop in ath6kl_wmi_tx_complete_event_rx() without validation against the buffer length. This allows out-of-bounds reads of up to 1020 bytes past the WMI event buffer when the firmware sends an inflated num_msg. Add a check that the buffer is large enough to hold the fixed struct and the num_msg variable-length entries. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68340 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: occ: validate poll response sensor blocks The OCC poll response parser walks a counted list of sensor data blocks. It used the static backing-array capacity as the parse boundary, but a transport response makes only data_length bytes current and valid. A truncated response can therefore make the parser consume a block header or block extent outside the current response. Use data_length as the parent boundary, prove the fixed poll header and each current block header before reading them, and prove the complete block before advancing. Keep parsed sensor metadata local until the complete response has passed validation, then publish it. Propagate malformed-response errors before publishing the OCC as active. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68326 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: bound uAP association event IEs to the event buffer mwifiex_process_uap_event() handles EVENT_UAP_STA_ASSOC by exposing the (re)association request IEs that the firmware copies into the event: sinfo->assoc_req_ies = &event->data[len]; len = (u8 *)sinfo->assoc_req_ies - (u8 *)&event->frame_control; sinfo->assoc_req_ies_len = le16_to_cpu(event->len) - (u16)len; event->len is supplied by the device firmware and is never validated, and the subtraction is unchecked. assoc_req_ies points into adapter->event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE], a fixed-size array embedded in the kmalloc()'d struct mwifiex_adapter. On the ap_11n_enabled path mwifiex_set_sta_ht_cap() walks these IEs with cfg80211_find_ie(), whose for_each_element() loop dereferences each element header. A firmware-reported event->len larger than the bytes actually received makes assoc_req_ies_len describe IEs that extend past event_body, so the walk reads out of the adapter slab object, a slab-out-of-bounds read (KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_find_ie). An event->len smaller than the header instead makes the int subtraction negative, which wraps to a huge size_t when stored in assoc_req_ies_len. The same length is handed to cfg80211_new_sta(), so a more modest over-claim can also copy stale event_body bytes into the NL80211_CMD_NEW_STATION notification. A malicious or malfunctioning mwifiex device (USB/SDIO/PCIe) can deliver such an event while the interface is in AP/uAP mode. Validate event->len before use: reject a length that underflows the header or that would place the IEs outside the event_body[] buffer the event was copied into. event->len here is struct mwifiex_assoc_event.len, a payload field internal to this event, not the transport frame length, so it is validated in this handler rather than at the generic MWIFIEX_TYPE_EVENT receive path, which only sees the event cause and the transport frame length. The bound is against event_body[MAX_EVENT_SIZE] rather than the actually-received length because the transports store the event differently (USB and SDIO leave the 4-byte event header in event_skb, PCIe strips it via skb_pull), whereas event_body is the single fixed buffer all of them copy the event into. This is the event-path analogue of the receive-path bounds checks added in commit 119585281617 ("wifi: mwifiex: Fix OOB and integer underflow when rx packets"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68229 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cedrus: skip invalid H.264 reference list entries Cedrus consumes H.264 ref_pic_list0/ref_pic_list1 entries from the stateless slice control and later uses their indices to look up decode->dpb[] in _cedrus_write_ref_list(). Rejecting such controls in cedrus_try_ctrl() would break existing userspace, since stateless H.264 reference lists may legitimately carry out-of-range indices for missing references. Instead, guard the actual DPB lookup in Cedrus and skip entries whose indices do not fit the fixed V4L2_H264_NUM_DPB_ENTRIES array. This keeps the fix local to the driver use site and avoids out-of-bounds reads from malformed or unsupported reference list entries. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68219 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix potential out-of-bounds issues The maximum downscaling factor supported by ISI can be up to 16. Add minimum value constraint before applying the setting to hardware. Otherwise, the process will not respond even when Ctrl+C is executed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68196 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 8.3 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res); without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes hif_drv->assoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be validated before the driver accesses the fixed header. For a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps. For a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of 65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at buffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data (CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an out-of-bounds read of res->status_code at offsets 2 and 3. Reject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the header or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure on this path: the caller falls through to a "conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS" check after the parser returns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short response be treated as a successful association. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68172 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: make huge_ptep_get handled unaligned addresses huge_ptep_get() can be handed a virtual address pointing to the middle of a contpmd/contpte mapped hugetlb folio (examples of callers are pagemap_hugetlb_range, page_mapped_in_vma). The arm64 helper rewalks the pgtables in find_num_contig to answer whether the huge pte we have maps a contpmd or a contpte hugetlb folio, and returns CONT_PMDS or CONT_PTES, so that it can collect a/d bits over the contiguous ptes. We can falsely return CONT_PTES instead of CONT_PMDS if the addr is not aligned. On systems where CONT_PTES != CONT_PMDS (meaning page size is 16K), we could collect excess A/D bit state, meaning extra work for the kernel. Even worse, we may iterate beyond the PTE table and dereference a garbage ptep pointer to access physical memory we don't own. Since the ptep pointer is a linear map address, we may run off the end of the linear map or into a hole, dereference a VA not mapped into the kernel pgtables and cause kernel panic. Fix this by aligning the pmdp pointer down to a contpmd base before checking equality with the passed huge pte pointer, to correctly answer whether the huge pte is the base of a contpmd block. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68160 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case: snaptrace = h + 1; snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len); p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len; ... case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT: if (snaptrace_len) { ... if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, snaptrace + snaptrace_len, false, &realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced. Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68158 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Fix multiplication overflow in decode_new_up_state_weight() If a message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains a (maliciously) corrupted osdmap, out-of-bounds memory accesses may occur in decode_new_up_state_weight(). This happens because the bounds check for the new_state part is based on calculating its length depending on a len value read from the incoming message. This calculation may overflow leading to an incorrect bounds check. Subsequently, out-of-bounds reads may occur when decoding this part. This patch switches the multiplication to use check_mul_overflow() to abort processing the osdmap if an overflow occurred. Therefore, osdmaps/messages containing large values for len that result in a multiplication overflow are treated as invalid. [ idryomov: rename new_state_len -> new_state_item_size, formatting ] | ||||