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CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2022-48774 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-24 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: ptdma: Fix the error handling path in pt_core_init() In order to free resources correctly in the error handling path of pt_core_init(), 2 goto's have to be switched. Otherwise, some resources will leak and we will try to release things that have not been allocated yet. Also move a dev_err() to a place where it is more meaningful.
CVE-2022-48776 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-24 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: parsers: qcom: Fix missing free for pparts in cleanup Mtdpart doesn't free pparts when a cleanup function is declared. Add missing free for pparts in cleanup function for smem to fix the leak.
CVE-2024-35991 2 Linux, Redhat 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux 2025-09-24 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: idxd: Convert spinlock to mutex to lock evl workqueue drain_workqueue() cannot be called safely in a spinlocked context due to possible task rescheduling. In the multi-task scenario, calling queue_work() while drain_workqueue() will lead to a Call Trace as pushing a work on a draining workqueue is not permitted in spinlocked context. Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x7d/0x140 ? __queue_work+0x2b2/0x440 ? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? __queue_work+0x2b2/0x440 queue_work_on+0x28/0x30 idxd_misc_thread+0x303/0x5a0 [idxd] ? __schedule+0x369/0xb40 ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 ? irq_thread+0xbc/0x1b0 irq_thread_fn+0x21/0x70 irq_thread+0x102/0x1b0 ? preempt_count_add+0x74/0xa0 ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x103/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> The current implementation uses a spinlock to protect event log workqueue and will lead to the Call Trace due to potential task rescheduling. To address the locking issue, convert the spinlock to mutex, allowing the drain_workqueue() to be called in a safe mutex-locked context. This change ensures proper synchronization when accessing the event log workqueue, preventing potential Call Trace and improving the overall robustness of the code.
CVE-2024-35938 2 Linux, Redhat 3 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux, Rhel Eus 2025-09-24 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: decrease MHI channel buffer length to 8KB Currently buf_len field of ath11k_mhi_config_qca6390 is assigned with 0, making MHI use a default size, 64KB, to allocate channel buffers. This is likely to fail in some scenarios where system memory is highly fragmented and memory compaction or reclaim is not allowed. There is a fail report which is caused by it: kworker/u32:45: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x40c00(GFP_NOIO|__GFP_COMP), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0 CPU: 0 PID: 19318 Comm: kworker/u32:45 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-1.gae4495f-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) 493b6d5b382c603654d7a81fc3c144d59a1dfceb Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x60 warn_alloc+0x13a/0x1b0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0xab/0x210 __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0xd3e/0xda0 __alloc_pages+0x32d/0x350 ? mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] __kmalloc_large_node+0x72/0x110 __kmalloc+0x37c/0x480 ? mhi_map_single_no_bb+0x77/0xf0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] ? mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] __mhi_prepare_for_transfer+0x44/0x80 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] ? __pfx_____mhi_prepare_for_transfer+0x10/0x10 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814] device_for_each_child+0x5c/0xa0 ? __pfx_pci_pm_resume+0x10/0x10 ath11k_core_resume+0x65/0x100 [ath11k a5094e22d7223135c40d93c8f5321cf09fd85e4e] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ath11k_pci_pm_resume+0x32/0x60 [ath11k_pci 830b7bfc3ea80ebef32e563cafe2cb55e9cc73ec] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 dpm_run_callback+0x8c/0x1e0 device_resume+0x104/0x340 ? __pfx_dpm_watchdog_handler+0x10/0x10 async_resume+0x1d/0x30 async_run_entry_fn+0x32/0x120 process_one_work+0x168/0x330 worker_thread+0x2f5/0x410 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe8/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Actually those buffers are used only by QMI target -> host communication. And for WCN6855 and QCA6390, the largest packet size for that is less than 6KB. So change buf_len field to 8KB, which results in order 1 allocation if page size is 4KB. In this way, we can at least save some memory, and as well as decrease the possibility of allocation failure in those scenarios. Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30
CVE-2022-48801 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-24 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: buffer: Fix file related error handling in IIO_BUFFER_GET_FD_IOCTL If we fail to copy the just created file descriptor to userland, we try to clean up by putting back 'fd' and freeing 'ib'. The code uses put_unused_fd() for the former which is wrong, as the file descriptor was already published by fd_install() which gets called internally by anon_inode_getfd(). This makes the error handling code leaving a half cleaned up file descriptor table around and a partially destructed 'file' object, allowing userland to play use-after-free tricks on us, by abusing the still usable fd and making the code operate on a dangling 'file->private_data' pointer. Instead of leaving the kernel in a partially corrupted state, don't attempt to explicitly clean up and leave this to the process exit path that'll release any still valid fds, including the one created by the previous call to anon_inode_getfd(). Simply return -EFAULT to indicate the error.
CVE-2025-21632 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-24 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registers The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state. Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it. The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some call sites of the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not understood when shadow stack support was put in place. As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That check just happened to avoid the warning. But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina Schimpe: WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6e/0x80 ? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 ? __warn+0x91/0x150 ? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 ? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 ? __pfx_ssp_get+0x10/0x10 ? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0 ? ssp_get+0x52/0xa0 __regset_get+0xad/0xf0 copy_regset_to_user+0x52/0xc0 ptrace_regset+0x119/0x140 ptrace_request+0x13c/0x850 ? wait_task_inactive+0x142/0x1d0 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90 arch_ptrace+0x102/0x300 [...] Ensure that shadow stacks are active in a thread before looking them up in the XSAVE buffer. Since ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK and user_ssp[SHSTK_EN] are set at the same time, the active check ensures that there will be something to find in the XSAVE buffer. [ dhansen: changelog/subject tweaks ]
CVE-2021-47460 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-24 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix data corruption after conversion from inline format Commit 6dbf7bb55598 ("fs: Don't invalidate page buffers in block_write_full_page()") uncovered a latent bug in ocfs2 conversion from inline inode format to a normal inode format. The code in ocfs2_convert_inline_data_to_extents() attempts to zero out the whole cluster allocated for file data by grabbing, zeroing, and dirtying all pages covering this cluster. However these pages are beyond i_size, thus writeback code generally ignores these dirty pages and no blocks were ever actually zeroed on the disk. This oversight was fixed by commit 693c241a5f6a ("ocfs2: No need to zero pages past i_size.") for standard ocfs2 write path, inline conversion path was apparently forgotten; the commit log also has a reasoning why the zeroing actually is not needed. After commit 6dbf7bb55598, things became worse as writeback code stopped invalidating buffers on pages beyond i_size and thus these pages end up with clean PageDirty bit but with buffers attached to these pages being still dirty. So when a file is converted from inline format, then writeback triggers, and then the file is grown so that these pages become valid, the invalid dirtiness state is preserved, mark_buffer_dirty() does nothing on these pages (buffers are already dirty) but page is never written back because it is clean. So data written to these pages is lost once pages are reclaimed. Simple reproducer for the problem is: xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 2000" -c "pwrite 2000 2000" -c "fsync" \ -c "pwrite 4000 2000" ocfs2_file After unmounting and mounting the fs again, you can observe that end of 'ocfs2_file' has lost its contents. Fix the problem by not doing the pointless zeroing during conversion from inline format similarly as in the standard write path. [[email protected]: fix whitespace, per Joseph]
CVE-2021-47453 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-24 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Avoid crash from unnecessary IDA free In the remove path, there is an attempt to free the aux_idx IDA whether it was allocated or not. This can potentially cause a crash when unloading the driver on systems that do not initialize support for RDMA. But, this free cannot be gated by the status bit for RDMA, since it is allocated if the driver detects support for RDMA at probe time, but the driver can enter into a state where RDMA is not supported after the IDA has been allocated at probe time and this would lead to a memory leak. Initialize aux_idx to an invalid value and check for a valid value when unloading to determine if an IDA free is necessary.
CVE-2023-52866 1 Linux 2 Linux, Linux Kernel 2025-09-24 7.1 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: uclogic: Fix user-memory-access bug in uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks() When CONFIG_HID_UCLOGIC=y and CONFIG_KUNIT_ALL_TESTS=y, launch kernel and then the below user-memory-access bug occurs. In hid_test_uclogic_params_cleanup_event_hooks(),it call uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks() with the first arg=NULL, so when it calls uclogic_params_ugee_v2_has_battery(), the hid_get_drvdata() will access hdev->dev with hdev=NULL, which will cause below user-memory-access. So add a fake_device with quirks member and call hid_set_drvdata() to assign hdev->dev->driver_data which avoids the null-ptr-def bug for drvdata->quirks in uclogic_params_ugee_v2_has_battery(). After applying this patch, the below user-memory-access bug never occurs. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000329: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000000001948-0x000000000000194f] CPU: 5 PID: 2189 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G B W N 6.6.0-rc2+ #30 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x87/0x600 Code: f3 f3 65 48 8b 14 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 54 24 60 31 d2 48 89 fa c7 44 24 30 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 28 02 f8 02 01 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 2c 04 00 00 48 8b 9d 48 19 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 RSP: 0000:ffff88810679fc88 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000329 RSI: ffff88810679fd88 RDI: 0000000000001948 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1020f639f0 R10: ffff888107b1cf87 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 1ffff11020cf3f92 R13: ffff88810679fd88 R14: ffff888100b97b08 R15: ffff8881030bb080 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888119e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000005286001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 DR0: ffffffff8fdd6cf4 DR1: ffffffff8fdd6cf5 DR2: ffffffff8fdd6cf6 DR3: ffffffff8fdd6cf7 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x87/0x600 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x550 ? uclogic_parse_ugee_v2_desc_gen_params+0x70/0x70 ? load_balance+0x2950/0x2950 ? rcu_trc_cmpxchg_need_qs+0x67/0xa0 hid_test_uclogic_params_cleanup_event_hooks+0x9e/0x1a0 ? uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x600/0x600 ? __switch_to+0x5cf/0xe60 ? migrate_enable+0x260/0x260 ? __kthread_parkme+0x83/0x150 ? kunit_try_run_case_cleanup+0xe0/0xe0 kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x4a/0x90 ? kunit_try_catch_throw+0x80/0x80 kthread+0x2b5/0x380 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Modules linked in: Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:uclogic_params_ugee_v2_init_event_hooks+0x87/0x600 Code: f3 f3 65 48 8b 14 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 54 24 60 31 d2 48 89 fa c7 44 24 30 00 00 00 00 48 c7 44 24 28 02 f8 02 01 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 2c 04 00 00 48 8b 9d 48 19 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 RSP: 0000:ffff88810679fc88 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000329 RSI: ffff88810679fd88 RDI: 0000000000001948 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1020f639f0 R10: ffff888107b1cf87 R11: 0000000000000400 R12: 1ffff11020cf3f92 R13: ffff88810679fd88 R14: ffff888100b97b08 R15: ffff8881030bb080 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888119e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000005286001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 DR0: ffffffff8fdd6cf4 DR1: ---truncated---
CVE-2023-52843 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-24 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: llc: verify mac len before reading mac header LLC reads the mac header with eth_hdr without verifying that the skb has an Ethernet header. Syzbot was able to enter llc_rcv on a tun device. Tun can insert packets without mac len and with user configurable skb->protocol (passing a tun_pi header when not configuring IFF_NO_PI). BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in llc_station_ac_send_test_r net/llc/llc_station.c:81 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in llc_station_rcv+0x6fb/0x1290 net/llc/llc_station.c:111 llc_station_ac_send_test_r net/llc/llc_station.c:81 [inline] llc_station_rcv+0x6fb/0x1290 net/llc/llc_station.c:111 llc_rcv+0xc5d/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:218 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5523 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5637 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5723 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5782 tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555 tun_get_user+0x54c5/0x69c0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002 Add a mac_len test before all three eth_hdr(skb) calls under net/llc. There are further uses in include/net/llc_pdu.h. All these are protected by a test skb->protocol == ETH_P_802_2. Which does not protect against this tun scenario. But the mac_len test added in this patch in llc_fixup_skb will indirectly protect those too. That is called from llc_rcv before any other LLC code. It is tempting to just add a blanket mac_len check in llc_rcv, but not sure whether that could break valid LLC paths that do not assume an Ethernet header. 802.2 LLC may be used on top of non-802.3 protocols in principle. The below referenced commit shows that used to, on top of Token Ring. At least one of the three eth_hdr uses goes back to before the start of git history. But the one that syzbot exercises is introduced in this commit. That commit is old enough (2008), that effectively all stable kernels should receive this.
CVE-2023-52816 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-23 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix shift out-of-bounds issue [ 567.613292] shift exponent 255 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' [ 567.614498] CPU: 5 PID: 238 Comm: kworker/5:1 Tainted: G OE 6.2.0-34-generic #34~22.04.1-Ubuntu [ 567.614502] Hardware name: AMD Splinter/Splinter-RPL, BIOS WS43927N_871 09/25/2023 [ 567.614504] Workqueue: events send_exception_work_handler [amdgpu] [ 567.614748] Call Trace: [ 567.614750] <TASK> [ 567.614753] dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70 [ 567.614761] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 567.614763] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x156/0x310 [ 567.614769] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 567.614773] ? update_sd_lb_stats.constprop.0+0xf2/0x3c0 [ 567.614780] svm_range_split_by_granularity.cold+0x2b/0x34 [amdgpu] [ 567.615047] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 567.615052] svm_migrate_to_ram+0x185/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 567.615286] do_swap_page+0x7b6/0xa30 [ 567.615291] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 567.615294] ? __free_pages+0x119/0x130 [ 567.615299] handle_pte_fault+0x227/0x280 [ 567.615303] __handle_mm_fault+0x3c0/0x720 [ 567.615311] handle_mm_fault+0x119/0x330 [ 567.615314] ? lock_mm_and_find_vma+0x44/0x250 [ 567.615318] do_user_addr_fault+0x1a9/0x640 [ 567.615323] exc_page_fault+0x81/0x1b0 [ 567.615328] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [ 567.615332] RIP: 0010:__get_user_8+0x1c/0x30
CVE-2021-47431 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-23 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix gart.bo pin_count leak gmc_v{9,10}_0_gart_disable() isn't called matched with correspoding gart_enbale function in SRIOV case. This will lead to gart.bo pin_count leak on driver unload.
CVE-2021-47425 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-23 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: acpi: fix resource leak in reconfiguration device addition acpi_i2c_find_adapter_by_handle() calls bus_find_device() which takes a reference on the adapter which is never released which will result in a reference count leak and render the adapter unremovable. Make sure to put the adapter after creating the client in the same manner that we do for OF. [wsa: fixed title]
CVE-2021-47424 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-23 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i40e: Fix freeing of uninitialized misc IRQ vector When VSI set up failed in i40e_probe() as part of PF switch set up driver was trying to free misc IRQ vectors in i40e_clear_interrupt_scheme and produced a kernel Oops: Trying to free already-free IRQ 266 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5 at kernel/irq/manage.c:1731 __free_irq+0x9a/0x300 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn RIP: 0010:__free_irq+0x9a/0x300 Call Trace: ? synchronize_irq+0x3a/0xa0 free_irq+0x2e/0x60 i40e_clear_interrupt_scheme+0x53/0x190 [i40e] i40e_probe.part.108+0x134b/0x1a40 [i40e] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x158/0x1c0 ? acpi_ut_update_ref_count.part.1+0x8e/0x345 ? acpi_ut_update_object_reference+0x15e/0x1e2 ? strstr+0x21/0x70 ? irq_get_irq_data+0xa/0x20 ? mp_check_pin_attr+0x13/0xc0 ? irq_get_irq_data+0xa/0x20 ? mp_map_pin_to_irq+0xd3/0x2f0 ? acpi_register_gsi_ioapic+0x93/0x170 ? pci_conf1_read+0xa4/0x100 ? pci_bus_read_config_word+0x49/0x70 ? do_pci_enable_device+0xcc/0x100 local_pci_probe+0x41/0x90 work_for_cpu_fn+0x16/0x20 process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 worker_thread+0x1cf/0x390 ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 kthread+0x112/0x130 ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 The problem is that at that point misc IRQ vectors were not allocated yet and we get a call trace that driver is trying to free already free IRQ vectors. Add a check in i40e_clear_interrupt_scheme for __I40E_MISC_IRQ_REQUESTED PF state before calling i40e_free_misc_vector. This state is set only if misc IRQ vectors were properly initialized.
CVE-2021-47393 2 Linux, Redhat 6 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux, Rhel Aus and 3 more 2025-09-23 7.1 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (mlxreg-fan) Return non-zero value when fan current state is enforced from sysfs Fan speed minimum can be enforced from sysfs. For example, setting current fan speed to 20 is used to enforce fan speed to be at 100% speed, 19 - to be not below 90% speed, etcetera. This feature provides ability to limit fan speed according to some system wise considerations, like absence of some replaceable units or high system ambient temperature. Request for changing fan minimum speed is configuration request and can be set only through 'sysfs' write procedure. In this situation value of argument 'state' is above nominal fan speed maximum. Return non-zero code in this case to avoid thermal_cooling_device_stats_update() call, because in this case statistics update violates thermal statistics table range. The issues is observed in case kernel is configured with option CONFIG_THERMAL_STATISTICS. Here is the trace from KASAN: [ 159.506659] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in thermal_cooling_device_stats_update+0x7d/0xb0 [ 159.516016] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888116163840 by task hw-management.s/7444 [ 159.545625] Call Trace: [ 159.548366] dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 [ 159.552084] ? thermal_cooling_device_stats_update+0x7d/0xb0 [ 159.635869] thermal_zone_device_update+0x345/0x780 [ 159.688711] thermal_zone_device_set_mode+0x7d/0xc0 [ 159.694174] mlxsw_thermal_modules_init+0x48f/0x590 [mlxsw_core] [ 159.700972] ? mlxsw_thermal_set_cur_state+0x5a0/0x5a0 [mlxsw_core] [ 159.731827] mlxsw_thermal_init+0x763/0x880 [mlxsw_core] [ 160.070233] RIP: 0033:0x7fd995909970 [ 160.074239] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 28 d5 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 99 2d 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff .. [ 160.095242] RSP: 002b:00007fff54f5d938 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 160.103722] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000013 RCX: 00007fd995909970 [ 160.111710] RDX: 0000000000000013 RSI: 0000000001906008 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 160.119699] RBP: 0000000001906008 R08: 00007fd995bc9760 R09: 00007fd996210700 [ 160.127687] R10: 0000000000000073 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000013 [ 160.135673] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007fd995bc8600 R15: 0000000000000013 [ 160.143671] [ 160.145338] Allocated by task 2924: [ 160.149242] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40 [ 160.153541] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0xa0 [ 160.157743] __kmalloc+0x1a2/0x2b0 [ 160.161552] thermal_cooling_device_setup_sysfs+0xf9/0x1a0 [ 160.167687] __thermal_cooling_device_register+0x1b5/0x500 [ 160.173833] devm_thermal_of_cooling_device_register+0x60/0xa0 [ 160.180356] mlxreg_fan_probe+0x474/0x5e0 [mlxreg_fan] [ 160.248140] [ 160.249807] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888116163400 [ 160.249807] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 [ 160.263814] The buggy address is located 64 bytes to the right of [ 160.263814] 1024-byte region [ffff888116163400, ffff888116163800) [ 160.277536] The buggy address belongs to the page: [ 160.282898] page:0000000012275840 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888116167000 pfn:0x116160 [ 160.294872] head:0000000012275840 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 160.303251] flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) [ 160.309694] raw: 0200000000010200 ffffea00046f7208 ffffea0004928208 ffff88810004dbc0 [ 160.318367] raw: ffff888116167000 00000000000a0006 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 160.327033] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 160.333270] [ 160.334937] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 160.356469] >ffff888116163800: fc ..
CVE-2021-47392 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-23 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cma: Fix listener leak in rdma_cma_listen_on_all() failure If cma_listen_on_all() fails it leaves the per-device ID still on the listen_list but the state is not set to RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND. When the cmid is eventually destroyed cma_cancel_listens() is not called due to the wrong state, however the per-device IDs are still holding the refcount preventing the ID from being destroyed, thus deadlocking: task:rping state:D stack: 0 pid:19605 ppid: 47036 flags:0x00000084 Call Trace: __schedule+0x29a/0x780 ? free_unref_page_commit+0x9b/0x110 schedule+0x3c/0xa0 schedule_timeout+0x215/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x19e/0x1e0 wait_for_completion+0x8d/0xf0 _destroy_id+0x144/0x210 [rdma_cm] ucma_close_id+0x2b/0x40 [rdma_ucm] __destroy_id+0x93/0x2c0 [rdma_ucm] ? __xa_erase+0x4a/0xa0 ucma_destroy_id+0x9a/0x120 [rdma_ucm] ucma_write+0xb8/0x130 [rdma_ucm] vfs_write+0xb4/0x250 ksys_write+0xb5/0xd0 ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.19+0x123/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Ensure that cma_listen_on_all() atomically unwinds its action under the lock during error.
CVE-2021-47391 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-23 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cma: Ensure rdma_addr_cancel() happens before issuing more requests The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution background request cannot be active twice. CPU 1 CPU 2 rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_IDLE -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) #1 process_one_req(): for #1 addr_handler(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); [.. handler still running ..] rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) !! two requests are now on the req_list rdma_destroy_id(): destroy_id_handler_unlock(): _destroy_id(): cma_cancel_operation(): rdma_addr_cancel() // process_one_req() self removes it spin_lock_bh(&lock); cancel_delayed_work(&req->work); if (!list_empty(&req->list)) == true ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done kfree(id_priv) process_one_req(): for #2 addr_handler(): mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); !! Use after free on id_priv rdma_addr_cancel() expects there to be one req on the list and only cancels the first one. The self-removal behavior of the work only happens after the handler has returned. This yields a situations where the req_list can have two reqs for the same "handle" but rdma_addr_cancel() only cancels the first one. The second req remains active beyond rdma_destroy_id() and will use-after-free id_priv once it inevitably triggers. Fix this by remembering if the id_priv has called rdma_resolve_ip() and always cancel before calling it again. This ensures the req_list never gets more than one item in it and doesn't cost anything in the normal flow that never uses this strange error path.
CVE-2023-52803 2 Linux, Redhat 3 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux, Rhel Eus 2025-09-23 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Fix RPC client cleaned up the freed pipefs dentries RPC client pipefs dentries cleanup is in separated rpc_remove_pipedir() workqueue,which takes care about pipefs superblock locking. In some special scenarios, when kernel frees the pipefs sb of the current client and immediately alloctes a new pipefs sb, rpc_remove_pipedir function would misjudge the existence of pipefs sb which is not the one it used to hold. As a result, the rpc_remove_pipedir would clean the released freed pipefs dentries. To fix this issue, rpc_remove_pipedir should check whether the current pipefs sb is consistent with the original pipefs sb. This error can be catched by KASAN: ========================================================= [ 250.497700] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dget_parent+0x195/0x200 [ 250.498315] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800a2ab804 by task kworker/0:18/106503 [ 250.500549] Workqueue: events rpc_free_client_work [ 250.501001] Call Trace: [ 250.502880] kasan_report+0xb6/0xf0 [ 250.503209] ? dget_parent+0x195/0x200 [ 250.503561] dget_parent+0x195/0x200 [ 250.503897] ? __pfx_rpc_clntdir_depopulate+0x10/0x10 [ 250.504384] rpc_rmdir_depopulate+0x1b/0x90 [ 250.504781] rpc_remove_client_dir+0xf5/0x150 [ 250.505195] rpc_free_client_work+0xe4/0x230 [ 250.505598] process_one_work+0x8ee/0x13b0 ... [ 22.039056] Allocated by task 244: [ 22.039390] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 22.039758] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 22.040109] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x59/0x70 [ 22.040487] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0xf0/0x240 [ 22.040889] __d_alloc+0x31/0x8e0 [ 22.041207] d_alloc+0x44/0x1f0 [ 22.041514] __rpc_lookup_create_exclusive+0x11c/0x140 [ 22.041987] rpc_mkdir_populate.constprop.0+0x5f/0x110 [ 22.042459] rpc_create_client_dir+0x34/0x150 [ 22.042874] rpc_setup_pipedir_sb+0x102/0x1c0 [ 22.043284] rpc_client_register+0x136/0x4e0 [ 22.043689] rpc_new_client+0x911/0x1020 [ 22.044057] rpc_create_xprt+0xcb/0x370 [ 22.044417] rpc_create+0x36b/0x6c0 ... [ 22.049524] Freed by task 0: [ 22.049803] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 22.050165] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 22.050520] kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x50 [ 22.050921] __kasan_slab_free+0x10e/0x1a0 [ 22.051306] kmem_cache_free+0xa5/0x390 [ 22.051667] rcu_core+0x62c/0x1930 [ 22.051995] __do_softirq+0x165/0x52a [ 22.052347] [ 22.052503] Last potentially related work creation: [ 22.052952] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 22.053313] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x8e/0xa0 [ 22.053739] __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x6b/0x8b0 [ 22.054209] dentry_free+0xb2/0x140 [ 22.054540] __dentry_kill+0x3be/0x540 [ 22.054900] shrink_dentry_list+0x199/0x510 [ 22.055293] shrink_dcache_parent+0x190/0x240 [ 22.055703] do_one_tree+0x11/0x40 [ 22.056028] shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x61/0x140 [ 22.056461] generic_shutdown_super+0x70/0x590 [ 22.056879] kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60 [ 22.057234] rpc_kill_sb+0x121/0x200
CVE-2023-52796 2 Linux, Redhat 2 Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux 2025-09-23 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvlan: add ipvlan_route_v6_outbound() helper Inspired by syzbot reports using a stack of multiple ipvlan devices. Reduce stack size needed in ipvlan_process_v6_outbound() by moving the flowi6 struct used for the route lookup in an non inlined helper. ipvlan_route_v6_outbound() needs 120 bytes on the stack, immediately reclaimed. Also make sure ipvlan_process_v4_outbound() is not inlined. We might also have to lower MAX_NEST_DEV, because only syzbot uses setups with more than four stacked devices. BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc9000e803ff8 (stack is ffffc9000e804000..ffffc9000e808000) stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 13442 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.52-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023 RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x4/0x2a0 mm/kasan/generic.c:188 Code: 48 01 c6 48 89 c7 e8 db 4e c1 03 31 c0 5d c3 cc 0f 0b eb 02 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff 5d c3 cc 00 00 cc cc 00 00 cc cc 55 48 89 e5 <41> 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 b0 01 48 85 f6 0f 84 a4 01 00 00 48 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e804000 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff817e5bf2 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff887c6568 RBP: ffffc9000e804000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: 1ffff92001d0080c R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffff87e6b100 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fd0c55826c0(0000) GS:ffff8881f6800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc9000e803ff8 CR3: 0000000170ef7000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <#DF> </#DF> <TASK> [<ffffffff81f281d1>] __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/shadow.c:31 [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:72 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] cpumask_test_cpu include/linux/cpumask.h:506 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] cpu_online include/linux/cpumask.h:1092 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] trace_lock_acquire include/trace/events/lock.h:24 [inline] [<ffffffff817e5bf2>] lock_acquire+0xe2/0x590 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5632 [<ffffffff8563221e>] rcu_lock_acquire+0x2e/0x40 include/linux/rcupdate.h:306 [<ffffffff8561464d>] rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:747 [inline] [<ffffffff8561464d>] ip6_pol_route+0x15d/0x1440 net/ipv6/route.c:2221 [<ffffffff85618120>] ip6_pol_route_output+0x50/0x80 net/ipv6/route.c:2606 [<ffffffff856f65b5>] pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:584 [inline] [<ffffffff856f65b5>] fib6_rule_lookup+0x265/0x620 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:116 [<ffffffff85618009>] ip6_route_output_flags_noref+0x2d9/0x3a0 net/ipv6/route.c:2638 [<ffffffff8561821a>] ip6_route_output_flags+0xca/0x340 net/ipv6/route.c:2651 [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:100 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_process_v6_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:473 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:529 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] [<ffffffff838bd5a3>] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xc33/0x1be0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:677 [<ffffffff838c2909>] ipvlan_start_xmit+0x49/0x100 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:229 [<ffffffff84d03900>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4966 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3644 [inline] [<ffffffff84d03900>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x320/0x980 net/core/dev.c:3660 [<ffffffff84d080e2>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x16b2/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4324 [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3067 [inline] [<ffffffff855ce4cd>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:529 [inline] [<f ---truncated---
CVE-2023-52792 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2025-09-23 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/region: Do not try to cleanup after cxl_region_setup_targets() fails Commit 5e42bcbc3fef ("cxl/region: decrement ->nr_targets on error in cxl_region_attach()") tried to avoid 'eiw' initialization errors when ->nr_targets exceeded 16, by just decrementing ->nr_targets when cxl_region_setup_targets() failed. Commit 86987c766276 ("cxl/region: Cleanup target list on attach error") extended that cleanup to also clear cxled->pos and p->targets[pos]. The initialization error was incidentally fixed separately by: Commit 8d4285425714 ("cxl/region: Fix port setup uninitialized variable warnings") which was merged a few days after 5e42bcbc3fef. But now the original cleanup when cxl_region_setup_targets() fails prevents endpoint and switch decoder resources from being reused: 1) the cleanup does not set the decoder's region to NULL, which results in future dpa_size_store() calls returning -EBUSY 2) the decoder is not properly freed, which results in future commit errors associated with the upstream switch Now that the initialization errors were fixed separately, the proper cleanup for this case is to just return immediately. Then the resources associated with this target get cleanup up as normal when the failed region is deleted. The ->nr_targets decrement in the error case also helped prevent a p->targets[] array overflow, so add a new check to prevent against that overflow. Tested by trying to create an invalid region for a 2 switch * 2 endpoint topology, and then following up with creating a valid region.